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INTRODUCTION 
This paper has two objectivew. The broader purpose is to 
examine property tax exemptions as a subsidy for higher education. The 
narrower objective is to examine empirical data concerning this problem 
in respect to Boston, Massachusetts. The original intention was to 
quantify the data which is available for Boston and then to generalize 
the findings to the nation as a whole. 
The quality of the information and Boston's particular problema 
necessitates a more modest goal. To be sure, the data for Boston ia 
quantified, and the uniquely local problems are discussed. However, the 
generalizations covering a national policy in respect to property tax 
exemptions had to be based largely on assumptions. 
The first chapter examines the marginal analysis of the pricing 
mechanism and the role of subsidies in respect to education. The theo-
retical arguments for subsidization are set forth along with those par• 
ticular aspects of education which support the idea that education 
should be subsidized. 
The second chapter is also of a general nature. It is a presenta..: 
tion of the arguments which are advanced pro and con concerning this 
subsidy in respect to the effect• it might be expected to have on the 
efficiency and equity criteria which are set out in Ohapter i. 
Ohapter iii considers Boston. Here the subsidy is discussed in the 
light ~f the particular problems Boston has experienced in respect to 
property taxation. The nature of' the data on Boston suggests that Bos-
ton (which was selected because detailed data was available and at hand) 
is a poor model on which to demonstrate statistically the effects of this 
public policy. The i~iculties involved in making intelligent generali-
zations f'rom the data that are available are discussed. Also accompany-
ing Chapter iii is an. exposition of the statistics regarding Boston 1 s 
exempt educational property. 
Notwithstanding the unique problems of' Boston, a number of' generali-
zations regarding alternative forms of property tax subsidies are con-
sidered in Chapter iv. The argument is advanced that local governments 
may not be appropriate agents for subsidizing higher education and the 
probable effects of the federal government assuming a more important 
role in this direction are considered. 
Boston is not a good model. However, it is useful to examine the 
relationships which exist between taxable and exempt property valuations 
and to discuss the general problems in terms of Boston because a great 
deal has been written about Boston and it is an eminently fruitful 
source of' examples of the problems which arise from this policy of tax 
exemption subsidies. 
V' 
• CHAPTER I THE THEORY OF TAX EXEMPTION SUBSIDIES 
This chapter has three objectives. The first is to outlin~ 
the theoretical arguments for subsidizing the production or consumption 
of any commodity. The second is to discuss the qualifications of educa-
tion for subsidization, and the third to provide a description of the 
property tax exemption as a technique of subsidization within the frame-
work of taxation theory. 
The first problem is to show· why any activity should be subsidized. 
One very clear approach to showing why any activity should be, is to de-
scribe the world under conditions where subsidies would not be relevant 
and then to relax the assumptions. This is done by showing first the 
• economic ef'f'iciency of' the pricing system in allocating resot:l.rces, and 
then by elaborating on the circumstances under which it would not assure 
optimal resource allocation by itself. 
The economy of' the United States is essentially one of' free mar-
kets. Behind the concept of' a f'ree market there is the value judgment 
that the consumer is sovereign. What he values most is what ought to be 
produced and the cost to society o£ this production should be equal to 
society1 s gain. 
This is a situation of optimum economic ef'£iciency and is reached 
when these £our assumptions are fulfilled:',, (1) There is perf'ect competi-
tion. Everyone is a price taker and no one is able to inf'luence price 
by his market behavior. (2) There is full employment. Production o£ 
• one commodity cannot be increased without reducing production of' another. 
2 
(3) There are no external effectw from private economic behavior. No 
one but the parties involved benefits or loses from any private trans-
action. (4) The distribution of income is consonant with society 1 s value 
judgments. 
If these assumptions could be simultaneously fulfilled, nobody 
could be made better off without making someone else worse off. This is 
one objective definition of maximum welfare.1 
That the fulfillment of these four assumptions will lead to the 
optimal allocation of resources can be shown in terms of both consumption 
and production. Perfect competition insures the same price for everyone. 
If the price is the same to all consumers of a commodity, then all con-
sumers must have an equal marginal evaluation of that commodity (the mar-
ginal rate of substitution between that commodity and some other commodi-
ty is equal for both commodities). When two consumers (and this can be 
, -
extended to any two pairs and therefore to all consumers) have an equal 
. 
marginal rate of substitution between the two .given commodities (any two 
commodities and therefore all commodities) then neither can be made bet-
ter off without making the other worse off. 
A similar argument applies to producers. When any two producers 
(any two, and therefore all producers) have the same marginal rate of 
transformation (the rate at which two factors can be combined to produce 
.. 
a technically maximum output), na one producer, with full employment, can 
lThis is one definition only, since there are societies which 
are not organized on the premise of consumer savereignty. 
• 3 
• 
produce more without some other producer producing less. Under perfect 
competition, the marginal rate of transformation for two producers of 
two of the same commodities must be equal because marginal costs are 
equal and marginal costs must be equal since all producers are price 
takers in factor markets and marginal cost equals price. The maximum. 
profit position is marginal cost equals marginal revenue while marginal 
costs are not descending. The infinitely elastic demand curve of per-
feet competition assures that marginal revenue equals average revenue 
equals price in all markets. Since the consumers marginal rate of sub-
stitution equals the price and the price equals the marginal cost, the 
marginal cost equals the marginal rate of transformation; then the margi-
nal rate of substitution must equal the marginal rate of transformation 
and those commodities which are most highly desired are those which are 
produced. In terms of economic efficiency, no one could be made better 
off without making someone else worse off.2 
The assumptions necessary to fulfillment of' optimal efficiency are 
not likely to be simultaneously fulfilled in the real world. Since the 
description of' a subsidy is a basic objective of this paper, it is ~ 
portant to consider the assumption which precludes the need for subsidi-
zation first. The whole essence of subsidization is contingent on the 
2The preceding material was taken essentially from the follow-
ing sources: A. P. Lerner, The Economics of Control (New York: Mae-
millan Co., 1944), chaps. i,. ii, iii; J. E. Meade, Tr~de- and We·lf'are, 
Vol. II (London:. Oxford University Press, 19:)5), pp. 102-.118; Melvin 
Beider, Studies in the Theory ef Welfare (New Yo:rk: Columbia B"niversity 
Press, 1947), chap. ii; Paul A. ~amuelso~, Foundations of Economic 
Analysis (C~mbridge: liarvard_Un~versity Pr~ss, 1947), chap* v:iii;. 
Tibor Scitovsky, Welfare and Competition (Homewood, ;r11.: Richard D. 
Irwin, Inc., 1951), chaps. iv, viii. 
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effects which private transactions have on third parties. Vfuen indivi-
duals in their private transactions influence the well being of another 
individual not a party to the transaction, an external effect is created. 
These external effects may be beneficial (external economies) or detri-
~ 
mental (external diseconomies). Only external economieil will be discussed 
in detail in this paper.3 
An activity is subsidized when external economies result from it. 
The farmer who, when he drains his land, raises the quality of his neigh-
bor's soil has benefited his neighbor. An individual may enjoy his lei-
sure making his property more attractive by gardening~ and if this in-
creases the enjoyment of the neighborhood to passersby the gardener 1 s 
leisure consumption has benefited them. These are situations where the 
private marginal cost of production or eonsumption is higher than the 
social marginal cost. Alternatively expressed, the social marginal pro-
duct is greater than the private marginal product. Compensation of pri-
vate individuals for the external economies of their activity is necessary 
if everyone is going to be as well off as he could be without making 
others worse off. 
It is reasonable to infer that most individuals in communities in 
the United States have, within their communities, universally agreed 
. . .. 
3The classic example of an external diseconomy was described by 
Professor Pigou~ when he demonstrated the extra cost to the inhabi= 
tants of a c<:>mmunity which had more smoke producing indlilstries· than a 
similarly situated community without the smoke. These costs were for 
laundry, housecleaning; and maintenance, and in t~rms of health. 
A. 0. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (4th ed., London: Macmillan$ 
1932), PP• 184-185. 
•• 
• 
• 
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that the social marginal costs o~ private higher education are low~r 
than the private marginal costs and that education should be subsidiz~d. 
This inference is based on the ~act that all connnunities do exe.mpt }lro= 
perty which is ~or nonpro~it educational activity ~rom real estate pre-
perty taxes. It is necessary at this point to consider the nature of 
the social gains which may be supposed to result ~rom educational 0utput. 
The most important external econ0my from higher educati0n is an 
educated citizenry. 
Little need be said o~ general education: though 
the in~luence of that on industrial e~~iciency is 
greater than it appears. It is true that the chil-
dren o~ the working classe~ must very o~ten leave 
school, when they have but learnt the elements o~ 
reading, writing, arithmetic and drawing; and it is 
sometimes argued that part o~ the little time spent 
on these subjects would be better given to practi-
cal work. But the advance made at school is impor-
tant not so much on its own account, as ~or the 
power of future advance which a scho0l education 
gives. For a truly, liberal general education adapts 
the mind :to use ii:ts best ~aculties in business and 
to us4 business itself as a means o~ increasing cul-
ture. 
Marshall mentions children here and is presumably thinking o~ ele-
mentary and secondary education as well. It is sometimes asserted that 
these argu~nts would not apply to higher education since much higher 
education is devoted to pro~essional development and is in the individu-
al 1 s se~ interest~,5 and ~or this reason would not qual~y ~or subsidi-
4Al~red Marshall, Brinciples of Economics (8th ed., London: Mac-
millan, 1938), p. 208. 
5:F>or this argument, see Milten Friedman, 11 The Role of' Government 
in Education, 11 Economics and the Public Intere~t, ed. Robert Solo 
(Rutgers University Press:-T~55), pp. 12.g.-126. . . . . 
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zation ~n the grounds that it does contribute substantially to good citi-
zenship. However, to say it does not contribute to good citzenship as-
sumes that education ~or that purpose ends abruptly with high school 
graduation. This seems highly unlikely, ~or even many highly specialized 
schools devote resourc~s to general education and, o~ course, the liberal 
arts colleges are designed ~or this purpose. A much sa~er assumption 
would be that much higher education (even though much graduate work is 
pro~essional training) contributes toward making the individual a better 
citizen. 
In the long run, the community that has a relatively large propor-
tion o~ well educated citizens should be expected to manage its civic 
~~airs and responsibilities with greater ability and more care~ul 
weighing of political, social and economic alternatives. The well edu-
cated society is not easily propagandized and decisions are more apt to 
be made on the basis o~ clear, thought~ul analysis o~ a problem than 
on impassioned, emotional argumentation. 
Furthermore, there is a right number o~ pro~essionally educated per-
sons for a given quantity of population. It seems reasonable that the 
private marginal cost of certain pro~essional education could be higher 
than their social marginal costs. I~ this is so, then it becomes neces-
sary ~or society to educate ~or pro~essions to insure the right number 
o~ certain professions, such as doctors or elementary school teachers. 
Private initiative can not alWays be relied upon to ~ul~ill social re-
quirements. For example, many ~irms do pot wish to incur the expense of 
7 
training engineers because these~engineers, once trained, cannot be co~ 
palled to remain working for their benefactor. This element of mobility 
often makes it impossible for private effort to shoulder the responsibi-
lity of educational production • 
. Another important external effect of education stems from the pre-
sence of students in the community. This is not the argument that a 
large student population generates extra income, but that much of a stu~ 
dent population is qualified to provide community services at less than 
professional cost.6 Clinics, counseling services, and charitable insti-
6It is often argued that the presence of a large student;'-populatio:n 
in a community· generates extra income (Bureau of Business Research, Bos-
ton University College of Business Administration, The Economic Valu!' of 
Educational Institutions to New England jBoston& by the author, 195~ 
p. 21; Dodie Higgins, 11What Does the School of Higher Education Mean to 
the Community in Massa~husetts? 11 Industr.z; May,_ 196o, p. 27.) Student 
consumption of goods and servic.es. creates business and employment oppor-
tunities with income flol'fing into the educational center from all parts 
of the country. This argument for tax exemptions, advanced by Harvardf's 
president Pusey was made before the Cambridge Chamber of Commerpe. (Bos-
ton Globe, March 26, 1959, 1:) .) It must be noted that this type of'. ar-
gument is seldom attended by a ~gisqussion of the income potential of an 
alternative industry. It may be that Harvard does have a larger payroll 
than any of the next si* largest industries, and this may be because 
the alternative industries have not existed long enough historically to 
have competed for the necessary land area. Or, it may be that Harvard 
would have been the biggest industry and the best for Cambridge. even if 
historical circumstances had been different. 
·Considering an alternative industry, the industrial workers, a 
greater proportion of whom w·ould presumably be married, might generate 
a great deal more income than an equal number of students in the;tr de-
mand for goods and services for themselves and their £amilies. Even 
assuming equal v~pulations between workers 1 families and students, it 
would probably be d~ficult to show that students generate as much in-
come. On the other hand, students undoubtedly require fewer communi-
ty services. While it. is true that students do require some communi-
ty service, such as police at large athletic functions, it is also true 
that they generally do not require so much of such services as public 
schools for children or fire protection for their housing. To weight 
the income· argument objectively would require an entire sepa:rate study. 
A related argument is that students provide a relatively low cost 
8 
tutions are often provided services by students (to the extent that the 
-
students may be professionally qualified) of psychology,· sociology, me~ 
dicine, dentistry, theology, and similar disciplines. In one year alone, 
Boston University medical students made 20,000 calls to the homes of 
6,500 indigent persons in the city of Boston.7 These services, of course, 
represent mutual gain to the student and the community. 
In a similar vein are the specialist serv~ces by professors. These 
are in addition to the gains of an educated citizenry. The business 
firms and government agencies in a college community have a body of spe-
cialists with a peculiar knowledge of local conditions to call upon if' 
a knotty problem comes up. The business firms and government agencies 
in the non-college community either have to maintain more full time-ape-
cialists or go to the toil and trouble of employing someone who would 
presumably be less familiar with local conditions than a resident spe-
cialist in the college community would be. 
Related to both these last two points is the research effort car-
ried out almost continuously in many universities and colleges. As ro-
search progresses, social gains in the form of' increased material poten-
tial tend to be the product of technological discoveries that result. 
It seems that in addition to loftier motives, society should encourage 
labor supply. This is not considered a social gain here, since students 
if they were not in school would, have em}'loyment somewhere anyway. The 
competition between students for jobs also would have the tendency to 
bid down wa~es for non-college persons. Although of some advantage to 
employers, it is difiicult to see any added social advantage from em-
ployment that must exist anyway. 
7H· · ·t 26 ~gg~ns, £:£.• ~., p. • 
9 
education in its material self interest. 
In terms of the social gains that have been mentioned, a change in 
the subsidy such as its removal would have an immediate short run effect, 
as well as a long run effect. Removal of the subsidy would reduce or 
tend to reduce the quantity of educational output in both short and long 
runs. Since these economies which are immediately related to output 
were considered to be the more important effects of education, they were 
considered first. It is necessary to consider additional long run effects 
of a change in the subsidy as well. 
In the long run, there are no fixed costs. In terms of this prob-
lem, the quantity of educational property is the important fixed factor 
in the short run. This quantity of a productive factor will be affected 
in the long run by a change in the subsidy. It is very likely, for exam-
ple, that a reduction_in the subsidy will reduce the quantity or educa-
tional property. It is important to consider the social gains that ac-
crue to a community because the community has buildings of this certain 
type. Whereas a change in the subsidy would have an immediate effect on 
the social gains that have been previously considered, the effect on the 
following social gains would not necessarily be immediate or certain. 
The most important long run social gain to having educational pro-
perty in a community is the advantage to youth of living in proximity 
to an educational institution. This proximity is often an important fac-
tor in deciding Who, :will go to college. 
Young men and women who reside in or near a college 
town apparently have a better chance of going to 
•• 
college than those who do not. In a study on the 
need for a state University in the State of New York, 
Mr. Philip Cowen finds that communities with col-
leges in the vicinity have three times as many un-
dergraduages per 100 youth aged 18-21 as other com-
munities. 
When the community permits educational facilities to expand, lo-
10 
cal -stud;nts are, in a sense, receiving a subsidy in the form of either 
reduced transportation costs or reduced living costs by attending the 
local college. If the local school, as some schools do, gives scholar-
ships to local youngsters, this type of benefit becomes a virtual in 
lieu payment for some of the tax exemption the school is enjoying. 
Furthermore, the residents of a city in which there is a college 
have an intellectual milieu which would be difficult to obtain in its 
absence. A large number of students and faculty in a community create 
a demand for lectures by leading thinkers, artistic exhibitions, con-
certs, and similar cultural eventse This can provide the public at 
large with an increased number of alternatives :for a higher level of 
general education. Often,. in small college towns, the only theater or 
lecture hall equipped :for many such cultural events is owned by the col-
lege and provided to the community free or for a nominal fee. 
Then too, the charm of small college towns and the stature of the 
urban university may contribute to the value of real estate which is of-
ten higher in communities with schools than communities which are simi-
8
seymour Harris, How Shall We Pay For Education? (New York: Har-
per, 1948), p. 11 • 
11 
lar otherwise.9 
Finally, the presence of an educational institution in a communi-
ty tends to affect the self image of the community's citizens towards 
their town. A nationally known and respected educational institution 
may make a positive contribution to the prestige the community enjoys, 
particularly if the citizens experience satisfaction from knowing that 
:t<lil~ir community has subsidized the education of many of the world 1 s 
greats. This is more certainly so if citizens maintain their own pro-
perties more carefully to keep a proud face for the outsider to see. 
Given the fact that the marginal social cost of education is less 
than the marginal p._:>rivate cost, and that this fact has been recognized 
by all communities, it becomes necessary now to describe the technical 
details of how the subsidy is brought about by the exemption of real 
property from the real property tax. 
Property in the communitylO is evaluated by assessors and a tax 
rate is designated which when multiplied by the aggregate of asses~ed 
valuations will produce the property tax revenue requirements. 11 To the 
9Bureau of Business Research, Boston University College of Business 
Administration, ~· cit., p. 7• 
10
or taxing authority--this may be a county. U. S. Bureau of the 
Census, U. S. Census of Governments: l22I.' Vol"l V·: Taxable Property 
Values in the United States (Washington: U. S. Go'?'erl;lment Printing . 
Office, 1959), p. 12. 
11 . 
Of course, other tax bases are open to use by communities, but 
here all other tax revenues are assumed to be given so that the pro-
perty tax may be considered exclusively. 
There is an important distinction between the property tax rate 
of a city and its property tax effort. The tax rate is so many dollars 
• 
12 
extent that nonpro~it educational properties (and other properties) are 
exempt ~rom the tax, the valuations or the tax rate on nonexempt proper-
ty must be higher than i~ this revenue were not being ~oregone by the 
communities. All the students o~ any school which is exempt benefit 
~rom a uniform reduction in educational costs. This approach to taxation 
also assumes that the distribution of income is optimal in terms of so-
cial value judgments and that assessments on property are an index of the 
value of public services to the taxpayer, the value o~ public services 
to the individual being determined through a political process, on the 
assumption that greater property wealth and the need for public ser-
vices are directly related.l2 
It must be emphasized, however, that the marginal rate of substi-
tution between public services and some other goods for one taxpayer 
will not be equal to the marginal rate o~ substitution between public 
services and the same other commodity for any other taxpayer. Only in a 
public policy decision which is absolutely unanimous could they possibly 
per thousand dollars of assessed valuation, while the property tax e~­
fort is the percentage of average income required to pay the tax bill. 
One city may have three or four times as high a nominal tax rate as 
another identical city even when assessors feel that they are using the 
same assessment criteria. The second city may have a lower tax rate 
but have assessed values which are closer to the market price of pro-
perties, and both cities can be making the same tax effort. Even in 
communities where the assessed valuation is legally defined to be the 
fair market value~ such as it is in Massachusetts communities, it is 
possible for assessments-to be substantially different from market 
values, as they are in Massachusetts. The sales price to assessment 
value ratio (42.8%) indicates that properties in Massachusetts have 
been sold for slightly less than twice their assessed valuations, on 
the average. See ibid., pp. 8-9, 51, on Massachusetts. 
12see Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance (New York: 
McGraw Hill, 1959), pp. 86-89. 
13 
be, and then it is not ;_:~ikely because individuals aren't apt to be 
equally enthusiastic about public policy. However, if the presence of 
a college in the community tends to stabilize real estate values, the 
owner of a relatively expensive property will pay a larger absolute 
amount (but the same proportion of his tax bill) to compensate for this 
benefit than the owner of a less valuable property since he has a greater 
vested interest in seeing property values stabilized, even though both 
of them gain the same amount of real estate value stabilization. 
Having outlined briefly the theory supporting subsidies, qualifi= 
cations of education for subsidization, and the ·mechanics of the tax ex= 
emption subsidy, problems must be considered which arise when the as-
s~tions that (1) the distribution of income is consonant with social 
value judgments and (2) perfect competition prevails are dropped. 
All of this becomes complicated in ~eality. Considerations of ef-
ficiency may be in conflict with notions of eq~:.<ity} if the existing 
distribution of inca~ is not deemed satisfactory by society. Assume 
that the distribution of income is such that there is fon extremely we~l-
thy and an extremely poor class and that society wou1d prefer greater 
income equality. A progressive income tax is established which by ta-
king a greater proportion of income from the rich has a tendency to di-
minish the incentive of the rich to work or to invest in relatively high 
value buildings. 13 A marginal inequality for the rich between work and 
l)If there is a diminishing marginal utility to increases in in-
come, a progressive tax by taking a-greater proportion of income from 
the rich can lead to an equal marginal sacrifice of utility. If there 
is a constant marginal utility to increases in income, a propo:rtional 
14 
leisure or between consumption and investment in taxable property is be-
ing introduced in the interest of' redistributing income.l4 .:··, 
Now in this situation it may be decided that the loss of' economic 
ef'f'iciency is too great in comparison with the gain in equity. Yet if' 
there is too great a disparity in the income distribution, the impersonal 
f'orces of' perf'ect competition may not lead to the best possible worla. 15 
Unless human beings are substantially dif'f'erent f'rom one another in terms 
of' their needs or their acquisitiveness, it would be dif'f'icult to believe 
that greater inequality of' income is better than lesser inequality. It 
may be inf'erred to some extent f'rom the existence of' progressive taxes 
that today•s society would pref'er lesser inequality in the distribution-
, 6 
of' income, rather than more. 1 It may be that a distribution of' income 
tax will lead to equal marginal sacrifice. Regressive taxes, by taking 
a greater proportion of income f'rom the poor, f'or a given level of' be-
nefits, are the most burdensome~ except, of' course, if' one wished to 
argue that the marginal utility of' income increases with the income. 
14Meade, 2R• cit., pp. 49-50· A one time, unexpected progressive 
poll tax would be the one tax which would not lead to any marginal 
inequalities and could be used to redistribute income. 
l5Knut Wicksell, Lectures in Political Economy, trans. E. Classen, 
Vol. I (New York: Macmillan, 1954), P• 77• 
16rt is not the purpose of' thi~ note to say what social value judg-
ments concerning the distribution of' income should be. It is included 
to provide a criterion against which to judge the impact.of' a given pub• 
lie policy. The expression "egalitarian distribution of' income 11 appears 
frequently throughout this p~?-per, in 011e f'orm or another. - The :follow-
ing argument describes that expression. 
If' social yalue judgments are consonant with the following as~ 
sumptions; (1) that all men can experience satisfaction; (2) that all 
men experience.similar satisfactions; (5) that all men pref'er more 
wealth to less; and (4) that increases _i_p. .income lead to diminishing 
marginal utility of' income; then the optimal distribution of' income 
1-1ould be according to its marginal utility to individuals (provided 
that a redistribution to this end would not lead to a decr~ase in ag~ 
15 
towards equality, f'rom a position of' inequality, would contribute more·· 
gregate income.) 
A public policy to redistribute income according to marginal uti-
lities is patently impossible. No one can know his neighbor's needs. 
Abba Lerner points out, however, that an equal distribution of' income 
should, given the assumptions, be the best possible. His analysis 
is in terms of: the sizes of: the relative gains and los.ses f'rom alter-
native distributions. The f'o1lowing diagram. (reproduced f'rom. Lerner, ££. ~., p. 501 shows graphically the greate~ magnitude of: lo~s co~ 
pared to the lesser equi-probable gains which might occur if' attempts 
·were made to distribute income on the basis of' marginal utility. Ibid~, 
chap. vi. 
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At s curve of: diminishing marginal utility of' income is higher tha!l 
B's, ref'lecting a greater capacity to enjoy income. The unknowable 
optimum would be at S. If' a move is made f'rom the eq~ality position 
to one of' inequality, in.the f'irst case towards the optimum, the gains 
f'rom this move are represented by the area G.. However, it is just as 
likely that a move away f'rom. equality w~~l be ~ the wrong direction: 
the losses f'rom an eque.l sized move an.e represented by the area L. 
Since L is larger than G, and sipce it is impess,ible to know in which 
direct~-on to moveto maximize total utility, the most f'easible optimum 
is to stay as close to equality as possible. This best possible dis-
tribution of' income would be attained by taking income f'rom the rich 
(thereby increasing its marginal utility to them) and giving it to the 
poor (thereby decreasing it f'or them). Lerner s~ggests that if' the 
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towards fostering competition and to supporting notions of equity both, 
than it would cost in terms of creating marginal inequalities. 
Of course, since perfect competition does not prevail, all of these 
problems become more complex. For example, a subsidy might fail in in-
suring the best resource allocation if a compensating external diseconomy 
exists from monopoly power. Society would not wish to subsidize the ex-
ternal gains of' a. monopolist if these external gains coincidentally led 
to a social marginal ·product just equal to his private marginal product. 
It is conceivable that if there should be a critical shortage of educa-
tional facilities, some school or schools might ir~ocently restrict out-
put (perhaps to maintain standards) and earn monopoly returns. 
It is easy to see that the assumptions of' the optimum optimorUm. will 
in likelihood never be fulfilled simultaneously in the real world..l7 For 
example, a problem like this might arise: There is an equilibrium situ-
ation given, in which resource allocation and the distribution of incom~ 
is optimal (and the world is static in terms of tastes and relative pri-
p~ocess of income redistribution were not done abruptly, eventually 
everyone's marginal utility of income would tend towards equality. 
Furthermore, he asserts, not to accept the assumptions on which this 
best is based would be more consonant (generally) with a social phi-
losophy contrary to what ours professes to be. Ibid., p. 40. 
The problems of income distribution are continuous. Tastes, rela-
tive prices, and human capabilities to command income are always chan~ 
ging. Public policies which tend to establish or aggravate exi~?tibg 
inequalities in the distribution (~of income are acceptable or not in 
terms of onets own value judgments. 
17There are a number of optimal positions in which the marginal 
equalities are fulfilled. The optimum optimorum is the point on the· 
welfare frontier which also satisfies the social value judgments con-
cerning the distribution of income. Samuelson, ~· cit., . chap. viii. 
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ces, i. e., those factors affecting the distribution of income)t then 
there is an increase in the amount of property to be exempted which will 
necessitate an increase in the tax bill. Assessments and/or the proper~ 
ty tax rate must increase. If society regards the benefits of the in-
creased educational output as going to taxpayers in a proportionate re-
lation to their property wealth, the benefit theory will apply and a uni-
form increase in the tax rate or assessments (or both) will follow. If, 
however, the distribution of income were changed, either because the be-
nefits were not proportional to property wealth, or property wealth and 
income were not highly correlated, then the distribution of income would 
have to be considered. If it were regarded as the more important consi-
deration, differential assessments or differential tax rates on differ~nt 
classes of property would be required to change it according to the pre-
cepts of the ability to pay theory of taxation.18 Which choice will be 
made will depend on social values and on social and political action. 
However, knowing that the best is unattainable, that one goal usually 
has to be sacrificed to attain another, does not prevent using the eri-
teria of the best in judging existing situations to see if they are the 
18 
The ability to pay theory of taxation denies the possibility of 
imputing benefit shares to individuals. Musgrave, £E• cit., p. 90. 
Those who are able to pay must pay, the welfare concept being to require 
equal marginal sacrifice, since this meets the objective of least ag-
gregate sacrifice. The Slilm. (see ibid., p. 98) of disutilities is 
least when those with the higher marginal uti~ity of income are taxed 
less than those with the lower marginal utility of income. The pro= 
perty tax seems to be on the margin between a benefit tax and an abi-
lity to pay tax. It is supposed to be proportionate to benefits and 
income. The man with a valuable building wants much public service, 
but the value of his property wealth might well be an index of his in-
come, so that the property (see .!ill.•, p. 94/ tax could be based on 
the ability to pay as well._ 
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best possible. 
The existing situation is not the best if i~ is possible to make 
anyone better off than he is now, without making anyone else worse off; 
' 
or if by a redistribution of income, the social value judgment of indi~ 
viduals in society can be more closely realized than they were before 
the redistribution without a cost (such as a decline in real income) or 
a distortion of resource allocation greater than the gain. 
It may be the best feasible policy would sacrifice comp~:bsation 
for external economies in the interests of equity. On the other hand, 
equity might be willingly sacrificed to attain efficient resource allo-
cation. It may even be possible to rearrange public policy so that a 
net gain is possible in one or both respects without a loss in the 
other. It is necessary to take a look at the real world. 
CHAPTER II A CRITIQUE OF THE PUBLIC POLICY 
The preceding chapter was devoted to elucidating the theory 
behind property tax exemption subsidies for education. The object of 
this chapter will be to describe the problems relating to this subsidy 
in terms of the real world. As a matter of taste, these problems are 
presented in the form of a critique. Many examples of this general 
case will be taken from Boston, after first noting how Boston consti-
tutes an exception to the general case. 
The fact that tax exempt educational property is valued in Massae 
chusetts, and that Boston is an educational center which, it is felt, 
devotes more property to educational production than an otherwise com-
parable city, are the two important distinctions from the general case. 
Having noted these exceptions, and granting that some other cities (in 
addition to those in Massachusetts) could have similar distinctions, it 
is possible to describe a general case which will probably apply to 
most cities. 
The important generalization concerning the tax subsidy policy is 
that no one seems to know very much about its quantitative aspects. 
The Massachusetts Taxpayer's Federation attempted, a number of years 
ago, to determine whether or not the popular feeling that Boston was 
atypical in respect to the quantity of property which it exempted from 
taxation was justified.1 Information was sought concerning the value 
of tax exempt property from several cities in the United States which 
1From conversations with Miss Thompkins of that office. 
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were ~elt to be comparable to Boston in most respects. They never ob-
tained an answer because no other city could provide suf'~icient i~or-
:mation to present a comparison. In fact, so little is known about the 
value of traditionally exempt property2 that the Bureau o~ the Census 
considers it n ••• property which is entirely outside the scope o~ 
general property taxation and for which, accordingly, valuations do not 
generally appear on assessments rolls.tfJ 
This generalization does not apply to communities in Massachusetts. 
While it is ~elt that ~ew (i~ any) people have examined the quantitative 
problems o~ tax exemptions subsidies closely; there is, at least, suffi-
cient data to make this study of Boston possible. This in~ormation con-
sists of valuations for every piece of property in Massachusetts whether 
taxed or not. These valuations are the core of the next chapter.4 
All programs of taxation and subsidization must be viewed from their 
impact on efficiency and equity. The restho:f this chapter will consider 
these general problems. They will be treated separately here only to 
make the exposition more lucid; however, it must be remembered that a 
given policy of taxation or subsidization will have a simultaneous effect 
on both efficiency and equity. The problems of economic ef~iciency will 
2Government, church, non-profit hospitals, and educational insti~ 
tutions. Qe_. cit., p. 3. 
)Ibid. 
4 G. L. (Ter. Ed.) Ch. 59, sec. 5(;51). Clause )l refers to prop-
erty of literary institutions~ other exempt properties fall into 
different clauses. 
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be considered before considering equity. 
The subsidy to education from exempting educational property from 
real estate property taxes should lower (perhaps in combination with 
other subsidies) the private marginal costs of education to its social 
marginal costs. In the simplest case, tuition is reduced by the amount 
of the subsidy. Does this lowering of tuition accomplish the equation 
of private and social marginal c'osts, or does it perhaps reduce the pri-
vate marginal cost to less than the social marginal cost? Who knows? 
I~ is granted that the exact and proper dollar amount of the per-
feet subsi~y might always be somewhat uncertain in an everchanging world, 
but can one argue that any subsidy is near the proper amount when no one 
anywhere has any idea of the amounts involved? One would further expect 
that a community that plans its subsidies rationally will have subsidized 
educational output in relation to the quality of the education produced. 
The students in superior schools, if they, in fact obtain a better educa-
tion, will presumably be better equipped to provide greater gains to 
the community. The assumption implicit ih exempting property from taxa-
tion is that a relatively high dollar value for the property factor of 
production is complemented by relatively higher expenditures for other 
factor proportions. It is also implicitly assumed that so long as pro-
perty is for nonprofit activity it will make a positive contribution to 
5It is conceivable that any subsidy, particularly one of unknovrn 
magnitudes, might encourage some educational production to too great 
an extent and that external disecon~ies might arise from an overpro-
duction of educated persons who could not be effectively utilized in 
the occupation for which they have been trained. This, of course, 
would not necessarily diminish the utility of their general education. 
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educational output in proportion to its dollar value. Thus the physics 
laboratory and the stadium "Ihich cost identical sums are supposed to con-
tribute the same amount to the external economies of educational produc-
tion. While physical training and recreational facilities are undoubted-
ly important, they probably do not rank in importance with libraries and 
laboratories in the minds of most educators. The extent to which cemple~ 
mentary facilities for extracurricular activities ought or ought not to 
be subsidized is a difficult question, although trustees of educational 
institutions may be responsible for obtaining appropriate subsidies for 
these facilities by relatively greater or lesser expenditures for them 
in accordance with estimates of their r~lative importance. In the pres~nt 
state of knowledge, those most optimistic about the appropriateness of 
the quantity or quality of exempt facilities can only assume this appro-
priateness in respect to the general case. As with most questions con-
cerning this policy, these points are also sh~ouded with ignorance. 
Furthermore, no one knows what the subsidy is costing the community 
either in terms of foregone revenue or foregone opportunities. This un-
certainty is, of course, a general criticism of almost any indirect sub-
sidy. It may even be possible that external diseconomies are being 
caused by the tax which are of a more serious magnitude than the exter-
nal economies being compensated by the subsidy. Property taxes which 
are excessive in one community, compared to those in others, will, other 
things being equal, cause a city to become bereft of large quantities of 
its population and will, in the long run, lead to the possibility of 
substantial quantities of disinvestment in all kinds of properties. 
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Given that these observations raise questions as to the efficiency 
of the subsidy, it does not necessarily follow that the subsidy must be 
evaluated explicitly by the public in order for it to be accepted as the 
best feasible local government subsidy for education. It might be felt 
that the lack of knowledge concerning the magnitude of the subsidies 
would add weight to arguments that the subsidy is probably not the pro-
per amount to compensate for external economies. However, people are 
not fools and it would be highly presumptuous to assert either that they 
are fools or that if wise they are indifferent or complacent about taxes. 
This should not be construed as condoning ignorance concerning tax exemp-
tion subsidies. Quite the contrary; however, it should be recognized 
that the fact that every known community in this country does subsidize 
whatever educational institutions it has, in this way, and has presumably 
done so for as long as the community has existed (even as far back as 
before the nation came into being) constitutes a rather substantial impl:;t-
cit public endorsement of this particular public policy. Public accepta-
bility is one of the strongest arguments which can be submitted to per-
mit the inference that the public policy is satisfactorily accomplishing 
the social objectives of compensating for external economies. Of course, 
the majority could be wrong; but what other objective criteria can measure 
the desirability of any public policy in a democracy? And, unless in a 
particular case there is evidence that population movem~nts are functions 
of an effort to avoid tax exempt intensive areas (rather than, say, a 
change in tas~e for suburban living), it cannot really be asse~ed that 
the tax exemptions are causing people to move out of town. This is too 
.. 
often too simple an explanation. The same sort of argument applies to 
disinvestment in property. No one would suggest that the primary consi~ 
derations involved in cotton mills moving to the South was the fact that 
property taxes in New England communities were too high because of exemp~ 
tions.6 
Along with the implicit assumptions of adequacy and propriety there 
is another implicit assumption in the philosophy of exempting schools 
from real estate property taxation: that the external benefits of edu-
cational production are going to accrue to the city thait has done the 
subsidizing. This is an interesting assumption since it is commonly ac-
knowledged that mobility is a basic characteristic of the American popu= 
lationt 7 it wouldn•t seem that the college trained would be an exception 
to this generalization. 
It may be possible that the overwhelming majority of' graduates, in 
any year, would have been subsidized in order to provide other eommani-
ties (or even some graduates, other nations) with an edacated citizenry 
without having necessarily provided the subsidizing commanity with its 
proper complement of educated leaders. Furthermore, to the extent that 
dormit~ies are tax exempt (it is not known whether all are or not), 
this represents a subsidy f'or living which is mainly for the benefit o£ 
out of town students who are, of' course, free to go back to their own 
6 . Property taxes in the South might have been important, where 
manufacturers were granted substantial exceptions for building in so~ 
areas. Labor costs and proximity to raw materials were probably tho 
dictating considerations. 
7 Alvin H. Hansen and Harvey S. Perloff', State and Local Finance ~-
the National Economy: (Now York& ~orton, 1944), P•· 142... · -
home towns after graduation. The resident student whose family is con-
tributing to support the city through property taxes can conceivably 
be getting less subsidy than his counterpart who may never contribute 
any benefit to the subsidizing community whatsoever.8 
It is difficult, for example, following this line of' thought (aside 
-from the prestige factor, which may be important) to see the advantage 
derived by the citizens of Cambridge for having subsidized the education 
of an individual like the Age. Khan; ~Then at the same time, it may be im-
possible to show that Cambridge has all the educated persons it can uti~ 
lize. This example of the Aga Khan can be used to show non egalitarian 
equity effects as well. No criticism of the Aga Khan is implied. As a 
gesture of appreciation to Harvard, he gave fifty thousand dollars f'or 
a scholarship fund f'or students from the Arab world.9 The particular 
gain to Cambridge seems dubious, although the gains from this type of 
gesture will receive greater attention when the propriety of' other le-
vels of government as subsidizing agencies is considered. 
Whether or not this complement of' educational output is obtained 
from local schools, it may be felt that subsidization of the mobile stu-
dent is pointless. However, it is not really essential that the proper 
number of educated persons always be graduated from the local institu-
tiona since all known communities subsidize in this way. It is quite 
8
subsidization of' {iving by exempting dormitories or other student 
service properties from taxation can be justified theoretically on the 
assumption that these services are important complJments to education. 
The subsidi11:ation of complementary goods and services may b-e necessary 
to provide adequate compensation f'or the external economies of the 
principal product. 
9Boston Globe, June 10, 1959, 1:8 
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possible ~or any community to obtain the proper number 0~ educated per-
sons ~rom the output o~ institutions located in a large variety o~ com-
munities. It is true, o~ course, that di~~erent communities have di~-
.~erent tax e~~orts and that one community might be subsidizing education 
more than any other with which it exchanges educational output. This 
doesn~t necessarily mean that the citizens o~ the community which subsi-
dizes more are getting less than the other communities. On one hand, 
they may have accomplished the objective o~ proper educational output 
~or themselves and on the other it is easy to imagine a situation where 
most or all citizens o~ a community derive substantial satis~action in 
the ~orm o~ pregtige or cultural milieu ~rom the ~act that they are so 
generous to the support o~ education. In terms o~ the entire countryls 
e~~ort to produce educational output, it may be less costly ~or certain 
areas to produce the bulk o~ higher education because those areas are 
adapted to this specialty. 10 
While the intangible bene~its are ~elt to be very important (espe-
cially in a community like Boston or Cambridge where education is a ma-
jor industry) it should be recalled that the fact that a school is loca-
ted within the community is actually a reduction in transportation and 
away ~rom home living costs ~or the students o~ the subsidizing communi-
ty so that their parents are bene~iting directly ~rom the tax exception. 
10Even ~ this regi~nal specialization is solely the result o~ his-
torical coincidence, the concentration o~ ~acilities and personnel 
might make it less costly to educate in an area abounding in colleges 
like New England, rather than to start elsewhere from scratch. Such 
regional specialization would necessitate some provision ~or sue~ 
complementary ~acilities as dormitories as well as classroom buildings •. 
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Then too, there is a possibility that without the revenue that out of 
town students provide~ the school by their attendance, the school's to-
tal revenue could conceivably be inadequate to create or maintain a par-
ticular quality of education service._: A oohool that is supported through 
tuition and eventually endowments, by the very richest people from all 
over the country, can afford the very best facilities. 
Another advantage of the subsidy that deserves mention is that it 
has a zero cost of administration (iJ!! most cities). If the subsidy didn't 
exist or some alternative were being employed, the cost of assessing 
educational buildings would have to be considered. Some revenue is saved 
by not having the assessors value the property. 
The automaticity of th~s subsidy and the zero administrative cost 
assures some positive amount of subsidization at all times for the re-
venue foregone only. Assuming that the subsidy were not perfectly ap-
propriate, this as a second best situation assures that .at least some 
compensation would be provided for external economies, with less admi-
nistration than any alternative subsidy which might be suggested. 
The preceding observations should presumably be of great and legi-
timate concern to any community which subsidizes education through tax 
exemptions on educational propei;ty, and particularly to those communi-
ties which as educational centers forego extraordinary amounts of tax 
revenue. Since one is occasionally confronted with the expression "the 
erosion of the property tax base 11 when eleemosynary institutions are men-
tioned in connection with Boston's fiscal problems, it is actually some-
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what surprising that these questions have commanded so little attention. 
The second broad area of discussion in this chapter is the impact 
of the property tax exemption subsidy on considerations of equity. Ori-
ticism must be based on the assumption that the distribution of income 
is not optimal or that the effect of the policy could make it less than. 
optimal. The relative regressivity or the proportionality of property 
taxes will be considered as the basis for a discussion of the effect of 
the tax base on the distribution of income. 
Generally speaking, the real estate property tax is considered to 
be regressive. This view is more convincing when it can be shown that 
the property tax is more regressive than some feasible alternative. The 
principal alternative to the real estate property tax is the sales ta~ll 
The following quotation describes the nature of the property tax· 
and compares it to this alternative: 
When the ratio of taxes is computed to the average 
income of each income class in these cities, it 
shows the property tax to be regressive. A compari-
son of relative regressivity of the property tax 
and sales tax based on these d~ta furthermore shows 
the property tax to be more regressive for home-
owners in the low-income brackets than the sales 
tax, which agrees with the results of our study.l2 
There seem to be three reasons why these observations on the rela-
tively greater regressivity of the property tax might apply. If the 
11Although communities obtain revenue from many minor sources, 
such as license fees and parking meters, the major alternative to a 
real property tax is a sales tax. 
12 
Walter A. Morton, Housing Taxation (Madison: University of Wis-
consin Press, 1955),p. 149. 
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distribution of income were not equal,- one would be that the poor spend 
a greater proportion of their income for housing space than do the r~h. 
Assuming that there is this higher average propensity to consume 
housing and that the tax is regressive, the lack of uniformity in assess-
ment procedures which is most likely to occur and conspire to increase 
regressivity. There are two sources of improper assessment procedures. 
The first is quite innocent. 
The ability to assess is undoubtedly a positive function of assessing 
experience. Now, assuming that tho poor are more numerous than the rich 
and that more housing accommodations exist for them, it is also fairly 
safe to assume that those housing accommodations change hands in the mar-
ket more frequently than do mansions. If they do, assessors will gain 
su.bstantial experience in ascertaining their value, which they might 
'tTell lack in assessing property which turns over with substantially less 
frequency. Assessors may therefore very innocently assess housing for 
the poor much more closely to its market value than they do housing for 
the rich. Furthermore, there is always the possibility in some communi-
ties that some assessors will deliberately assess more valuable parcels 
of property at less than what the assessment criteria demand and make up 
this reduction in the revenue by pushing assessments of poorer parcels 
up to the limits of assessments criteria. This source of regressivity 
stems from the fact that the rich are more vocal and potentially more 
able to incluence local political considerations. It is not possible 
to tell whether the downward bias for assessments on expensive proper-
ties is a result of' political pressure or from an innocent effort by 
~0 
assessors to avoid overvaluing property i'Tith ·which they have had little 
experience. 
Concern over the effect of the property tax on the~stribution of 
income could stem not only from the departure from an optimal or aggra-
vation of a non optimal distribut~on of income but also because of the 
possibility that the tax burden on the poor is not remunerative. It may 
be that the poor neither benefit substantially more from local expendi= 
tures generally nor from the subsidized educational output in particular 
than do the rich. 
Throughout this entire discussion, the basic assumption has been 
that property taxes were regressive or were more regressive than some 
alternative such as sales taxes. ·Assuming that the tax were generally 
regressive, as these arguments would suggest, or even proportional, as 
it is supposed to be, it is important to consider the effects on the dis-
tribution of income brought about by the distribution of the subsidy. 
Quite apart from the effects of the tax, the subsidy can also affect 
the distribution of income. It would seem that this distribution is 
from the poor to the rich, since college attendance varies directly with 
family income. 1~ 
The rich attend college and are subsidized by a more than proportion= 
ate contribution of income from regressive taxes by the poor. These rich 
who attend college are the intelligent rich, although some of the bright 
1~rnest V. Hollis et al., Cosi3 of Attending 
Expenditures and_ Sources of Income (Was~ington:. 
Printing Office, 1957), PP• lt2, 47 •. 
College: !:_ Study of 
V· s. G?ve!~ent 
?1 
poor obviously also attend college. For the most part howeve~, the 
bright rich and some bright poor are being subsidized by the poor, both 
dull and bright. If it should happen that more bright poor attend col-
lege in the future (as well they might, since the number and variety of 
subsidies is growing) this redistribution of income from poor to rich 
might b~ modified somuwhat~ However, the dull (who are probably mostly 
poor) will never get such benefits as those of being within commuting 
distance of a college. 
The subsidy represents a uniform reduction in educational costs in 
any one school. If children of the rich and the poor attend the same 
school, this amounts to equal treatment of unequals and is a violation 
of basic welfare economics value judgments. While the rich man must 
be compensated for the social gains from this education, it is also true 
that he will go to college subsidy or not, if income is the dictating 
consideration; often the poor man needs the subsidy to attend at all. 
Since the objective of the subsidy is to increase the number of students, 
it would be deisirable for it to be given only to those who are on the 
margin of attendance. 
Furthermore, assume that a city has one assessment criterion for 
all property, such as. full market value; one tax rate applying to all -
property; and two schools. One school caters exclusively to the children 
of the rich. It has modern dormitories, classrooms, tennis courts, ska-
ting rinks, athletic stadiums, and all the sundry complementary facili-
ties asso~ed with schools with relatively greater wealth. The other 
school caters to the children of the poor. It provides less adequate 
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classrooms (in terms of size o~facilities) and has substantially fewer 
complementary facilities. With more tax exempt facilities per·student 
in the wealthier school than in the poorer school the per student sub-
sidy going to the rich student would be greater than that going to the 
poor student. Here the distribution of income is going from poor to 
rich. The un~ormity of the subsidy, and the existence of schools o£ 
different wealth in terms of facilities per student are undoubtedly non~ 
egalitarian. 
The regressivity of the pr~perty tax tends to reinforce this redis-
tribution of income. It is possible that those unable to send a child 
to college are in some measure supporting complementary facilities i'or 
the children of families in higp.er in.come brackets. The quantity of fa-
cilities can have an effect on the distribution of income quite as impor-
tant as an inappropriate quality or quantity can have on criteria of ef'-
f'iciency. 
The positive arguments concerning the ef'fect on the distribution of 
income caused by the distribution of the subsidy must be considered also. 
While it is certain that the subsidies are being derived £rom regres-
sive taxes and that more '~of the children of the rich go to college than 
do children of the poor, many of the same positive arguments which apply 
to the efficiency o£ the system may apply to the equity consideration 
as well. For example, the effects o£ the distribution of the subsidy 
do not mean that society would not prefer a more egalitarian distribution 
of income. It does suggest_ that income distribution might be considered 
the proper realm of the federal income tax and that the city in question 
prefers to show greater concern for economic efficiency (assumed here). 
The federal government is left with the job of income distribution. 
After all, a citizen of the community is also a citizen of the nation. 
Furthermore, it is not certain that, in the general case, concern 
over the impact of the public policy on the distribution of income is 
warranted. The policy is apparently acceptable to the public and again 
public acceptability is a strong argument for any policy in a democratic 
society. 
Students are being subsidized to some positive extent. If it were 
found that the exemption of tennis courts and the like were frustrating 
social efforts to redistribute income, some revaluation of the subsidy 
would result. A situation which is socially intolerable cannot last 
indefinitely. 
One other variety of criticism requires discussion. This is the 
abuses from which this public policy has suffered. Although the prime 
interest here is property taxes, it is interesting to note that North= 
western University was approached ever four hundred times in two years 
by business concerns in order for the college to obtain property and in-
come tax exemptions for their businesses. A sale~leaseback arrangement 
had been used by some col~eges and businesses, by which the business 
sold its buildings or capital equipment to the college (often with money 
it had loaned the college) and then rented it back. The income and the 
property of the business than became tax exempt because it was owned by 
a nonprofit institution. The business, instead of being able to deduct 
only interest and depreciation f'rom taxes, sold their building, and de-
ducted rent as a business expense, and paid a smaller income and of'ten 
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no property tax. 
This type of criticism does :not stem :from possible inherent f'aul t 
in the tax exemption subsidy system. The cure is very simple. It does 
not involve contemplating any fundamental change in the system. It is 
just a question of' proper policing. 
This chapter has dealt'.! with general problems concerning property 
tax exemption subsidies. Lack of' knowledge, the most signif'ic~a:-nt ge:ner-
al characteristic of' the policy makes it extremely dif'f'icult to make 
any certain g~neralizations. A look at the situation in a city like 
;B.oston, which is of'ten alleged to have a revenue problem aggravated by 
tax exempt properties will provide more substantial evidence on these 
questions. 
1411The Abuse of' Tax Exemptions, 11 Fortune, May, 1950, p. 74. The re-
lation between Ne·w York U-niversity ~d, Mueller Macaroni . Co. was ljl. noto-
rious example of' this type of' s.ituation. 
CHAPTER III EMPIRICAL DATA ON BOSTON, ]ff..ASSACHUSETTS 
This chapter will analyze the problems relating to tax exemp-
tion subsidies in the city o~ Boston. The quantitative generalizations 
and an analysis o~ the factors which make the subsidies what they are 
will be the important objectives. 
A number of important questions will be answered in the course of 
the discussion. These are: (1) to what extent does this subsidy con-
tribute to Boston's fiscal problems? (2) What is the dollar value of 
the subsidies going to the students in vari6us schools in Boston, and 
what is the likelihood that the subsidies, as computed, would actually 
represent the potential increase in per student costs if the tax exemp-
tions were removed? (5) Is this subsidy efficient? (4) It is equitable? 
While these question·s will necessitate a discussion of Boston 1 s fiscal 
situation, the solution to all Boston's problems will not be attempted 
here. 
Everyone knows that Boston has a fiscal problem. Seventy three of 
the central cities of the two hundred and nine Standard Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas in the country showed a decline in population between 
the 1950 and 1960 censuses. Boston was the fourth in percentage decline.1 
Boston has the highest per capita property tax expenditure in the 
1u. S. Bureau of the Census, Eighteenth Census of the United 
States: 1960. PC-P 5 & 4. The four cities declining most are (1) 
Wilkes Barre, Pa., (2) Providence, R. I., (3) Johnson, pa., and (4) 
Boston, Mass. 
country ($214.98) 2 and the highest tax effort in the country (percentage 
of average income going to support municipal services).) In the Interim 
City Worker 1 s Family Budget, Boston has the fourth highest average rent 
in twenty major cities.4 
Over one third of the real property in Boston is tax exempt. .The 
increase in exemptable property over the years is what is meant by Mayor 
Collins 1 expression 11 the erosion of the property tax base. 11 It would 
seem as though there were some grounds for complaint against any further 
diminution in the tax base. 
However, it would be well just to enumerate some of the other finan-
cial problems which Boston has, in order to put the cost of foregone 
revenue in its proper perspective. 
The Massachusetts State Legislature is extremely unsympathetic to 
Boston. It has often expounded the philosophy that Boston must put its 
own fiscal house in order before much more help can be expected from the 
state. Some of the explanation for this attitude is the disgust resi-
dents from other parts of the state feel for Boston 1 s alleged inefficiency 
and corruption, and some stems from the political fact that Boston is tra-
ditionally Democratic while the state is traditionally Republican.5 Fur-
2Greater Boston Real Estate Board, ~· cit., p. ). 
?charles Stokes, IIBo ston, The Property Tax and Ruin, 11 Boston Uni-
versity Business Review, Spring, 1960, p. )). 
4 U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review, LXXXIII:785 
(August, 1960). 
5Murray B. Levin, Tbe Alienated Voter (New York: Holt-Rinehart, 
n.d.), p. 3. ·~~ 
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thermore, the formula allocating support for public schools is outdated 
and biased in favor of rural areas. Boston and probably other large 
cities as well receive substantially less public school support. 6 
In addition, Boston 1 s transportation system, court system, police 
organization, and many other·municipal expenditure requirements have pro-
vided a substantial burden on local revenues.7 Then too, political his-
tory notable for its corruption has probably also aggravated fiscal 
8 problems. 
When all these factors are considered, lithe erosion of the property 
tax base,tr can be discussed with the awareness that it is not the only 
source of Boston 1 s difficulties. 
In terms of the values that are involved, property in Boston is 
worth $2,2)0,000,000, both taxable and exempt. Of this, $864,625,500 
is the dollar value of exempt property for all purposes.9 The dollar 
value of property exempt for Literary Institutions is $87,000,600. This, 
hovtever, includes a number of institutions which are not for higher edu-
cation. Examples of these include preparatory schools, literary societies, 
special libraries, and similar institutions. It is a question of defini-
.§.Greater Boston Real Estate Board, o-p. cit., p. 5. 
7In a speech given by Mayor Collins to a youth seminar at Old South 
Church on February 28, 1961, the Mayor asserted that the city had been 
unusually burdened >vith these expenditures. 
8
charles L. Whipple, t1Dirty Money in Boston, 11 The Atlantic Monthl~, 
March, 1961, p. 41. 
9This is the sum of totally exempt values and the value of exempt 
portions of partially exempt property. 
• 
tion as to what constitutes a school of higher education, but for the 
purposes of this paper, higher education is considered to require a 
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post high school level of literacy and to serve a post high school 
education function. The dollar value of properties that fit this defi-
nition is $,6o,819,300. Therefore, using these criteria, the taxes on 
2.1 per cent of the property in the city are being foregone for higher 
educational production. This is substantially different from the more 
than one third that is exempt for all purposes, which is frequently 
quoted. Thus, one point that investigation of this public policy brings 
out and which might reasonably be stressed is that the expression lithe 
erosion of the property tax base 11 should be used with caution by objec-
tive critics when higher education is dQscussed, since a much smaller 
proportion than one third is exempt for higher educational production. 
The foregoing of revenue in the interest of subsidizing eleemo~ynary 
aativity is an important problem in itself, however. A distinguishing 
feature of Massachusetts communities is that they represent the sole 
known exception to the general rule that exempt properties are not evalu-
ated. Furthermore, the evaluations that do exist are based on the theo-
retical dis~inction that the value of the site is a function of one set 
of variables su~~ as general quality of neighborhood while the value of 
improvements (buildings) is a function of another (perhaps overlapping) 
set of variables such as the cost of production. Unfortunately, other 
cities wh~~information concerning tax exem~~ions is available (outside 
of Massachusetts) could not be determined. Thus an assertion that Bos-
ton foregoes a disproportionate amount of revenue, without an index of 
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the amount foregone, is very unconvincing. Furthermore, what another 
city does to subsidize education is not really relevant except to the 
extent that opponents or proponents of the subsidy might attempt to 
influence public policy decisions by comparis~ns of foregone revenue 
which are of questionable accuracy. Judgments concerning the subsidy 
should probably be based only on quantitative estimates which will per-
mit inferences in respect to its effieiency and equity effects. 
According to the Massachusetts General Laws}0 all real property 
in all communities in Massachusetts shall be evaluated annually and as-
sessed at the full and fair market value. This criterion of full market 
value is generally not implemented and property is usually assessed at 
some ~raction of its full value. In Massachusetts this fraction is abeut 
:one·i.;half (42.8%). The fraction is obtained by dividing the sales prices 
of transferred properties into their assessed valuations. The General 
Laws also specifically state that all exempt properties shall be valued 
on the same basis as taxable property. If it were found that as much 
care had been applied to evaluating exempt properties as to taxable prop-
erties, one could then assert that education would increase in price by 
thq amount of the subsidy derived from:,.us.ing the existing assessment 
valuations times the annual tax rate and dividing by the full time equiva-
lent number of students. 
Boston's assessment department maintains a card for each parcel o~ 
property in the city. To facilitate making the valuation information on 
10
oh. 59 sec. 5. Extracted from a form supplied by the Assessor 1 s 
Office. 
...... ----------~~~"~ 
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these cards public, IBM listings are prepared for the public
1
s use. It 
was from the IBM listing of exempt property that the infor~tion for 
this paper was obtained. For educational property the appropriate list-
ing is entitled Literary Institutions, (Clause 31). Property exempt for 
A J, d A5_11 
eleemosynary functions is essentially in clauses 31, 32, /3, 3~, an / -
These designations may be thought of as 3~1, 3-2, etc. In the 
Clause 31 listing are found the name, address, (or location of unnumbered 
properties such as empty lots), the area, the value of land, the value 
of the building, and the total value of every exempt parcel of property 
ovmed by a Literary Institution within the political boundaries of Bos-
ton. 
As noted, not all Literary Institutions were considered. In addition 
to these properties belonging to exclusively literary societies, associa-
tions, aud private college preparatory schools, there was also excluded 
from the list the property belonging to the Eliot School, the Boston Mu-
sic School, and the Academie Moderne. These are examples of the type of 
schools which offered instruction on both an individual basis and to 
groups of per sons vfho are not generally considered to be of college age 
or to have necessarily attained a post high school level of literacy. 
For example, the Eliot School teaches handicrafts to persons of all ages, 
but from the description, it appears that mostly retired people take ad= 
vantage of its courses. The Academie Moderne offers charm courses to 
11 These exempt functions are listed by the assessors according to a 
clause number designated in the Massachusetts General Laws. This clause 
one represents the property owned by the f'ederaJ government, clause two 
the property owned by the Commonwealth, etc. 
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young women of all ages, including those still in high school, and the 
Boston Music School treats students on an individual basis regardless 
of age. 
No judgment concerning the social advantage of these schools is to 
be inferred from their exclusion. It is simply a matter of their not 
be.ing classifiable as higher education in the sense of college equiva-
lent. All schools which fulfilled some specific post high school educa-
tive function were included whether they were degree granting institu-
tions or not. In the first approximation, a school had to have tax exempt 
property, and in the second, it had to be analogous to a college in 
terms of the public it served. 
The valuations (which appear in the appendix) were listed by schools 
and summed. Twenty five schools which fulfilled the criteria outlined 
above appear in the Literary Institution exempt list. The average sub-
sidies and standard deviations are computed on two bases. The first in-
cludes the twenty two schools which are located principally in the city 
of Boston proper. The second adds Boston College and Harvard and Tufts 
Universities, which are principally outside of Boston. This distinction 
is made because it would be impossible to impute the number of students 
on the main campuses who use the intown facilities of these essentially 
out of town schools. Also these schools are il1 communities which may be 
substantially different in their assessment effieiency from Boston, making 
it impractical to compute subsidies for all the students outside Boston 
as we11. 12 To combine data for out of town schools with those entirely 
12see Roswell J. Townsend, 11 Inequalities of Assessment Procedures in 
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located in the city might cause the computation of averages to be mis-
leading. By presenting the average on both bases, the differences be-
tween the two alternatives can be readily appreciated. 13 
The classification of a parcel of exempt property into one or ano-
ther of the 11 thirtyn clauses is probably not on a strictly formal basis. 
Thus some schools in the city have property that is exempt under various 
other clauses, such as the Charitable, (Clause 32), the Benevolent (Clause 
33), and the Scientific (Clause 34) listings. This may be attributable 
to informality of classification, but it could also result from an effort 
to make one group or another seem larger or smaller, particularly if there 
were strong public feeling concerning the exemption of a particular class 
of property at the time the property in question became exempt. For exam-
. . :--~.;~'·· ' --. 
ple, an interested citizen, wanting to know the exempt value oi'~e>~ols 
and calling the Assessor's Office, would be quoted a dollar value for the 
amoLmt of literary property that Was exempt and he Would be cautioned 
that this included literary associations: This student was not cautioned 
that some school property was .in other exemption clauses. 14 
Greater Boston Communities, n National Tax Journal IV: 361 (December, 1951). 
13rt is very difficult to explain the very large s~bsidy for Boston 
Col~ege students unless it can be attributed to a time lag between the 
movement of teaching facilities to Chestnut Hill and the disposal of 
intown facilities. 
14Tax exempt property belonging to educational institutions but ex-
empted from taxation under ~oms non literary exemption clause was deter-
mined by checking the Assessor's listipgs against the Boston Real Estate 
Board's annual publication Assessed ValQes: Real Estate in Boston (Bos-
ton: by the author) (commonly known, as Blue Book of Assessed Valuations 
and hereafter cited as Blue Book) and matching them up. Reconciliation 
was accomplished by employing an assessment department employee who had 
The subsidies from these valuations were compqted ih the following 
manner: 
V = valuations for property of each school 
R =tax rate ($100.70 for 1960) 
F'IE = full time equivalent students for each school 
S = per student subsidy 
The subsidies are listed in the following table: 
TABLE I 
SUBSIDIES, PER STUDENT EXPENDITURES, AND TUITIONS--ALL SCHOOLS 
(All expenditure data 1960 except as noted) 
School 
1. Suffolk University 
2. Bentley School of 
Accounting 
5· Chamber layne Junior 
Colleget; 
4. Northeastern Universityb 
5· Fisher Junior College 6. Carnegie Technical 
Institutec 
7· Portia Law School 
8. Emerson College 
9· Mary Brooks Schoold 
Subsidy 
25.42 
52.40 
57-16 
45.64 
46.08 
46.75 
52.94 
69.75 
77-54 
Per student 
Expenditur§ 
458.58 
422.57 
1888.89 
415.84 
89).09 
718.61 
772-71 
1064.09 
~58-58 
aPer student expenditure data is for 1953· 
Tuition 
per ye~~ 
700 
650 
675 
665 
800 
1295 
510 
900 
650 
bTuition figure represents average tuition, weighted by enrollments. 
cPer student expenditure data is for 1959. 
dPer student expenditure data is for 1952 • 
. acdess to nonpublic records to find out which clause they should be in. 
This precluded going through the entire set of exemption listings. 
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Per Student Tuition 
School Subsidy Expenditure per year 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
New England College of' 
Pharmacy 80.10 863.16 584 
Boston School of' 
Occupational Therapy 86.81 2:.,notdat.a. 850 
Boston Universitye 99.00 1299.10 937-33 
Boston Conservatory of <' 
Music ; 12l.o4 3850.28 750 
Wheelock: College 121.38 1330~23 900 
Wentworth Institute 124~45 1093.28 6oo 
Tufts University 138.50 2221.41 1000 
Garland School of 
Homemaking 140.77 1883.25 750 
Mas sachu s ett s College 
of Pharmacy 145.78 628:~94 500 
Massachusetts College 
of Optometry 167.83 610•27 650 
Simmons ·College 214.98 1535-26 900 
Emmanuel College 266~46 1046.;.37 700 
Forsythe School of' 
Dental Hygiene 491.69 2785.78 700 
New England Conservatory 
of Music 660.59 . 1775-16 1250 
Harvard University£ 933-03 no data. 1416 
Boston College 1373-79 993-32 800 
-eTuition figure represents average tuition, weighted by enrollments. 
f'Tuition figure represents average tuition, weighted by enrollments. 
, The average (mean) subsidy for the essentially in tovm schools is 
$143.38. The standard deviation is 158.Q_~. The mean subsidy f'or the total 
twenty five schools, including those with principal facilities out of ,_ 
town, is $223.98. The standard deviation here is 324.45; One would ex-
pect that this variation would be attributable to variation in the quali-
ty of education produced at the different schools. A rank correlation 
test using Kendall's Tau, on the per student expenditure made by the 
schools, as an ibdex of quality, revealed the positive but low correla-
tions of .31 and .286 re!Jpectively. Interestingly, a rank correlation 
• 
of' the subsidies on tuitions as a probable index of' students 1 :family 
income revealed the very low positive coef:ficients of .084 and .187, 
respectively. Schools were classifi~d according to whether they had 
two or four year programs, and rank correlations beh<een subsidies and 
indices of quality and income were calculated. The coefficients :for 
two year schools on school expenditures per student and tuition were 
.143 and .0278. There were no tvto year schools v-rith main campuses out 
of' town. For four year wchools the correlations were .485 and .362 
on expenditures. On tuitions, they were .021 and .297. The table 
below summarizes this in:formation. 
TABLE II 
RANK CORRELATIONS 
Classification 
1. Subsidies on expenditures 
2 year schools 
2. Subsidies on tuition 
2 year schools 
3· Subsidies on expendi-
tures 4 year schools 
in Boston only 
4. Subsidies on tuition 
4 year schools in 
Boston only 
5. Subsidies on expenditures 
4 year schools including 
those with part of faci-
lities in Boston 
Tau 
.0278 
.485 
.021 
1 
32 
33 
N 
7 
9 
12 
13 
14 
Standard 
~rror 
6.4 
9-5 
14.65 
16.25 
18.25 
Normal 
statistic a 
.468 
.105 
.9846 
1.80 
aWhere N is less than 10, this is not a normal statistic. See 
Maurice G. Kendall, Rank Correlation Methods (2d ed., London: Charles 
Griffin&Oo. Ltd., 1955), PP• 52,171. 
bSignificant at the IJ% level. Reject null hypothesis that Tau 0. 
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Standard Normal 
Classif'ication Tau s N Error Statistic 
6. Subsid~es on tuition . 
4 year schools in-
eluding those with 
part facilities in Boston .297 35 16 22.2 1.58 
7- Subsidies on expenditures 
All schools in Boston 
only .)l ' 53 19 28.6 1.85 
8. Subsidies on tuition 
All schools in Boston 
only .084 19 22 35·3 ·538 
9. Subsidies on expenditures 
All schools including 
those with part facilities 
in Boston .286 6o 21 33.12 ;\'":l.j;p 
10. Subsidies on tuition 
All schools including those 
with part f~cilities 
il'L. Boston .187 55 25 _38.92 1.43 
The null hyPothesis that Tau = 0 is acceptable for all these Taus 
except for the one computed on the per student expenditures in four year 
schools in the city proper. Granting this exception, the probability 
that Tau = 0 is so substantially within the 5.% limits for all other com-
'I 
putations that the correction for continuity and Sillittos re~inement ~ 
for. N•s without ties where N is less than ten would contribute little 
to the basic c~nclusions which may be inferred from the data. ~fuere the 
normal variable was close to the margin of acceptance or rejection, all 
corrections were checked. 
A word is necessary about the significant Tau for per student ex-
penditures for four year schools completely in the city. This may repre-
sent a statistically significant, moderate positive functional relation-
ship which would indicate that in this particular case the subsidies are 
efficient. However, the data was classified in various categories in or-· 
., .. _ 
der to determine if there were not, at least, some category of school 
for which the subsidies would show up as being related~ There may be 
grounds for suspicion of this coefficient when all other Taus are low 
and nonsignificant. In general ~terms, it should be quite reasonable 
to believe that either the relatio~nship between the subsidie:s and indi-
ces of educational quality and income are pretty much random or these 
indices are not satisfactory. Assuming the indices to be adequate, the 
explanation for the randomness, which could embrace all the different 
situations, can be found in the elements of error which are in all the 
data ;.rhich was collected. 
These sources of error will be considered in the following order. 
The relatively slighter, but still important, errors in~olved in compu-
ting full time equivalent student enrollments and the possible errors in 
the rankings of per student expenditures and tuitions will be considered 
first. The rest of the chapter will be devoted to the quality of assess-
ment valuations as they currently e;xist in the city records. It is 
.these latter points which make one skeptical of o~e single high and sig~ 
'nificant correlation. 
For the number of students enrolled at these institutions refer-
ence vas made to one or two standard works on college data and phone 
calls were made to the schools to fill in the information gaps that still 
remained. One advantage of using as few references as possible is the 
facility this provides the interested reader in verifying the data. The 
cost, of course, is that the information is of various dates, and in m~y 
in some instances be slightly dated. This was not .felt to be an import-
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ant loss, because fewer references also tend to provide data that is 
more comparable, since the compilers require reporting of information 
on the basis of uniform criteria. There would probably be much less 
uniformity if reported according to the tastes of school administrators 
solely. Then too, all regular enrollment data, as far as can be deter-
mined, are for fall or June enrollments. .An average subsidy computed 
on terminal enrollments will not be exactly the same as an average com-
puted on average enrollments because of intra year variation. .Average 
enrollments for computing the subsidy would probably be superior to ter-
minal enrollments. 
The number of students in each school is reported here on a full 
time equivalent student basis. Night students and summer students are 
assumed to use the same facilities as regular students and to subject 
these facilities to proportional wear and tear; therefore, they are as-
sumed to receive the same subsidy as full time regular students. Part 
time and summer students were also assumed to work on a thirty semester 
hour basis. regardless of any peculiar institutional arrangements for 
counting credits; and because most schools charged part time tuition that 
was proportional to full time tuition, all were assumed to do so, parti-
cularly where enrollments had to be computed from tuition data. Schools 
like Northeastern University that have an atypical semester scheduling 
tend to diminish the accuracy and comparability of the figures. At best, 
the figures in this paper should be considered as approximations. Attempts 
at greater refinement would lead to diminishing returns because of the 
approximate nature of the basic data. 
15 
l5The approximate nature of school enrollments is borne out by the 
It is very interesting to note that in a substantial number of in-
stances the inclusion of part time students as full time equivalent stu-
dents made little difference in the quantity of subsidization. However, 
part time and summer students are included in the data for whatever re-
finement they might provide. Since tuition for all part time work was 
assumed to be on a thirty hour per year basis, the calculation of full 
time equivalent students can be represented like this: 
Full time ~ Part time x Hou;r:s + 
)0 
Summer x Hours 
)0 
Some schools required special assumptions and computations to obtain 
full time equivalent enrollments. These are discussed in detail in the 
appendix to this chapter. 
The per student expenditures made by the schools are, of course, com-
puted from the full time equivalent number of students. Therefore, the 
denominator of the ratio is known to contain an error. The numerator 
which represents total expenditures is a figure that is reported to the 
assessment department as part of the requirements a school must observe 
to obtain personal property tax exemptions. Not all schools apply for 
the personal property tax exemption and the expenditure figures relate 
to the most recent year that any given school did apply for them. This 
experience of many who have attempted to count students. The difference 
between the typical full time student and a part time student is often 
one of definition by the school. There appears to be a tendency for 
administrations to overstate enrollments rather consistently. Ther~ must 
be a feeling that larger enrollments generally mean greater prestige. 
Of course, the quality of much of this data is a definite function of 
the accuracy of the person supplying it, especially when it had to be 
gathered from phone calls. Furthermore, phone call data is apt to be 
more up to date than information from published sources. 
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combination of intertemporal data is not good, but on the whole the ex.,. 
penditure data is not either. The formality of this requirement does not 
seem to be strict, since some schools which operate legiti~te taxable 
profitmaking activities report income and expenditures which are identi-
cal (as they would be in a double entry bookkeeping system). This iden-
tity of income and outgo is quite acceptable for totals, but when profit-
making activity also occurs, it 1'iould be coincidental for all nonprofit 
functions to also balance out exactly, unless separate accounts were main-
tained for profit and nonprofit activities. No definitions of income and 
expenditure data were available from the Assessor's Office so that, in 
addition to the funds vlhich may not have been expended for stude:uts,there 
are also apt to be some o:ue time expenditures which enlarge the per stu-
dent figures for any year disproportionately. Thus the figures for the 
Boston Oo:uservatory of Music and the Forsythe School of Dental Hygiene 
were excluded from the rank correlation analysis because they were sub-
stantially larger than all other per student expenditure figures. Schools 
with per student expenditures that were as high as twice the amount of 
tuition were included; however, those which were four to six times as 
great as tuition were felt to emb"ody one time expenditures during the 
year. 
Tuition may also be in error slightly. If every school provided 
educational service on the same basis, the cost of a semester hour would 
be comparable -between any two schools. However, there are variations in 
the computation of academic credit and in the charges for it. Further-
more, some schools have almost as many tuitions as they have subdivisions 
·• 
• 
·• 
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(~. Boston University and Northeastern University). .Averages must be 
used here, which although they are weighted by enrollments may not be 
a useful index of student incomes bepause the school 1 s administration, 
through a preference, may be subsidizing one subdivision at the expense 
of another. Rich students in one division may be contributing to the edu-
cation of poor students in another, or poor students may be subsidizing 
the rich. It might be inferred that the lesser cost of\~Boston University's 
School of Theology and Northeasternls School of Education could be attri-
buted to internal subsidization. Tuitions were also gathered from dif-
ferent time periods in order to be as consistent as possible with the 
time periods for the enrollment data that were obtained, particularly in 
the few instances where enrollments had to be weighted by tuition for a 
full time enrollment equivalency. Tuitions are also subject to change 
without notice. This may have important implications for rank orders 
when tuitions had to be obtained from telephone calls. Tuitions chan~ 
ging frequently require ideally that every school be called in the short-
est possible time. 
In all these variables, the types of error which occur, while they 
do not distort absolute magnitudes greatly, are those most apt to make 
rankings of the data inaccurate. This is especially true when the dif-
ference between a figure of one rank and that of another is very small. 
More accurate data might easily reverse the rank order of tvm or more 
close figures. This is just the sort of problem to spoil the validity 
of rank correlation analyses, where the proper rankings are more impor-
tant than the dimensions of the variables. 
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In addition, the subsidies are in error because some schools have 
extensive dormitory facilities while others have none at all. For the 
schools "I'Thich do, the per student subsidies to education are reported 
too high. Again, schools may be making profits on living facilities 
which are used to subsidize one or more of the subdivisions w-hich are 
running in the red. There is no way of being certain. 
If the exemption of school buildings were to cease, the price of 
education would not be so great as the subsidy for schools with the dor-
mitories, 1r1hile it "l'lould be exactly equal to the subsidy for schools 
>·rithout the dormitories. However, the average per student total cost 
of attending college would be raised by an amount somewhat closer to 
the subsidy. It would be between the average total cost of attending 
college now and the average total cost with the exemption removed.16 
The existence of functional designatio11s to indicate ,the uses of 
buildings in the assessors 1 listings, the code for which no~>one in the 
Assessor's Office seemed able to explain and which were not used con-
sistently, makes it impossible to tell to what use many buildings are 
put. 17 Several buildings belonging to different schools were designa-
ted as classrooms, dormitories, etc. There a number of buildings un-
classified "I'Thich were known to be dormitories and a number of buildings 
16Assuming that existing valuations would be used in taxing education-
al property. 
17It is a question of judgment and the responsibility of the assessor's 
office to label the function of a building like the Boston University 
School of Theology which has both classroom and dormitory facilities. 
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classified with cryptic designations which couldn 1t be explained. The 
feeling is that buildi1gs were once designated by function, but that 
there seemed to be little need for this, and the designations which were 
listed were left over from a time when greater care was taken in report-
ing the function of a building. 
Observations such as the preceding may if overemphasized be mis-
leading because the variation in the subsidy is probably also explained 
in part by such diverse and precisely unquantifiable factors· as the q_ua-
lity of the neighborhood in which any particular school is located, as 
well as by the accuracy of the data and the quality of assessments. 18 
These problems of data and building function seem to be almost tri-
vial in comparison with the problem of determining the appropriateness 
of the assessment valuations. It has been asserted by two students of 
the problem that the evaluations l'lhich exist for exempt property either 
may be more appropriate to the true value of the properties than those 
dn taxable property or that exempt valuations are generally less depend-
able than those taxable property. 
The first view was expressed by Miss Susan Thompkins of the Massa-
chusetts Federation of Taxpayers. She has asserted that the full market 
value criterion is applied to exempt properties when they are built as 
exempt properties rather than on a sales price to assessment ratio, since 
18
rn a relatively high value neighborhood, the subsidy may be a func-
tion of the generally high values surroundiag the school located there. 
Alternatively, the presence of the school in the neighborhood might make 
properties there more valuable. 
·• 
• 
• 
the value reported is a matter of indifference to all, there being no 
tax obligations. Professor Ne1vcomer has observed that valuations on 
exempt property are less dependable than those on taxable property~9 In 
respect to Boston, both of these women are almost completely right. 
In the course of a telephone conversation, an unidentified individu-
al in the Assessor's Department asserted that all valuations (exempt and 
taxable) are in strict compliance with the law and that assessors go out 
on the first work day of January annually and evaluate every parcel of 
property in the city individually. However, in a subsequent telephone 
conversation, Miss Thompkinst assertion was borne out by a statement from 
a supervisory employee of the assessment department that, as a matter of 
convenience, the full market value is reported on all :new exempt educa-
tio:nal property, because the assessment is a matter of indifference for 
everyone. 
Miss Thompkins t argument should be examined a 1little further, how-
ever. To be sure, the evaluation placed on a brand new educational 
plant is the same as the cost of that plant rather than being based on 
the sales price to assessment ratio. Nevertheless, properties which were 
once taxable and have been purchased by educational institutions are 
fairly consistently valued at the same dollar amotint as when they were 
taxable. Thus to obtain a correct subsidy presumably all ',one would 
have to do· is to deflate the values of new buildings by the sales price 
l9Mable Newcomer, liThe Growth of Property Tax Exemptions, 11 National 
Tax Journal, VI:ll6-llT(June, 195~.). 
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to assessment ratios, add in the valuations on old buildings, and then 
perform the per student subsidy calculations. 
Therefore, one could simply take the Assessor's Office means of 
identifying properties and check each piece of property in the city 
Building Department to see when it was built. Reference could be made 
to the Blue Books to see if the properties "rere ever held by taxpaying 
owners and the distinction between those buildings built for educational 
purposes originally and those built for some other purpose could be 
clearly determined. 
This was attempted. Assessors, however, identify property by 
street number when possible and by geographical location. The City 
Building Department has property identified by street number when possi-
ble and by lots for unnumbered areas. It is practically impossible to 
identify property if it does not include a street number. This is not 
the most difficult problem, however. It must be remembered that Boston 
is an exceedingly old city (compared to most). 
For some part of the past fifty or sixty years, when some of the 
property this paper is concerned with was being built, the application 
for a building permit was more 'Lof a courtesy to the city than a legal 
requirement. For this reason, it is impossible to determine the age of 
something less than half of the properties belonging to educational in-
stitutions in the city. No building permits exist. Furthermore, other 
reasons for not obtaining construction dates are that vacant lots do not 
require building permits (their physical dimensions are often shifted), 
and the building department has lost or misfiled some of the records. 
The problem is solvable, ::hm<Tever, by working through deed transfers at 
the Suf'f'olk County Registry of' Deeds. The drawback here is one of' 
costs. A prof'essional deed search by a larryer may cost thirty dollars 
or more. Even a simple search f'or the date of' the last transf'er of' 
ownership would, f'or about two hm1dred parcels of'.property, be~prohibi­
tively expensive. It could conceivably run as high as six thousand 
dollars. 
This problem throws the subsidies out of' line as much as, or more 
than, -::,the dif'f'icul ties surrounding the :functions of' various buildings. 
For example, assume a school has :fif'ty per cent new buildings assessed 
at f'ull market value and f'if'ty per cent assessed appropriately at the 
sales price to assessment ratio f'rom when the property was owned for a 
taxable f'unction. The subsidy derived from these assessments is not 
going to be in a consistent relationship with the subsidies derived f'or 
a school with all old property or all new property. 
Aside from the relatively less important er~s involved in compu-
ting f'ull time equivalent students, per student expenditures, and tui-
tions, there are now two important sources of' error. ]magine the inco~ 
parability of' subsidies in two schools; one with half new property, in-
cluding classrooms and dormitories, and one with all new or all:'old prop-
erty but without dormitories. If', as it may be supposed, a complete 
revaluation of all educational property were undertaken, in the event 
of the exemption subsidy· being withdrawn, there would probably be little 
relation between the subsidies calculated here and the increases in edu-
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cational costs which would be incurred after the removal of the tax exemp-
tion. Of course, it is always possible that ~he same valuations might be 
applied and then the error would be strictly limited to the inability to 
determine which buildings are dormitories. 
The difficulties involved in imputing to a piece of property the 
value it 'l'lould have if it were 11ot exempt are substantial. The informa-
tion that is available concerning past values is limited to dollar values 
on land, buildings, and total values, as published by the Greater Boston 
Real Estate Board in their annual Blue Books. This publication is limi-
ted in its definition to an imprecisely specified area which is less 
than the political entity of Boston and which fits only the requirements 
of the Real Estate Board. The first volume which is available (to this 
student) is for 1909. This was carefully checked. Other volumes which 
were examined 11ere for 1930, 1937, 1940, 1957, and 1960. There are 
exempt properties which have increased in value, decreased in value or 
stayed exactly the same for the past thirty years. It is impossible to 
tell from just the figures whether changes are attributable to in:fla~ion, 
depreciation, revaluation for equity considerations, political considera-
tions, or because properties or neighborhoods have appreciated. Street 
names have changed and property areas have been resurveyed, and redefined 
fairly freCJ.uently. Land values have decreased and building values in-
creased, leaving the total value changed greatly, only slightly, or not 
at all. ··:·valuations have changed or remained constant regardless of 'l'lhe-
ther the property was exempt or not. Some parcels can only be identified 
by similar square footage of area, while others have increased in size 
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(vacant lots, mostly) and the values have remained constant. The value 
of the land of one building exactly next to another was two and one half 
times as great per square foot as the value of the land under the build-
ing next to it. Looking at the two buildings; it is hard to tell before 
checking their street numbers which is which. An assessor familiar with 
Boston Is assessments for tvrenty five or thirty years might be able to de-
termine whether the valuations were a function of proximity to a street 
corner or the size of the building on the land. 
Transfers of ownership from taxpaying owners to exempt owners and 
vice versa have led to revaluations that have increased or decreased or 
stayed the same (except that no example was found for a decreased valu-
~tion when property went from exempt to taxable status.) 
If the problem surrounding the valuation of exempt properties were 
limited to making a distinction between old properties transferred from 
taxable owners and new properties built by schools and the determination 
of those properties which serve the production of educational output in 
contrast to complementary facilities, it might be worth the expense of 
a deed .search for every piece of exempt property. However, Professor 
Newcomer's observation that exempt property valuations are usually less 
dependable than valuations on taxable properties has interesting implica-
tions with respect to Boston. It is not that Professor Newcomer is 
wrong, it is just the valuations on taxable properties are so undependable 
in relation to assessment criteria that a distinction between the quality 
of taxable and exempt valuations would be artificial. 
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A look in the Blue Book f'or any two years which are separated by 
the Second World War should impress anyone with one or the other of' two 
observations: (1) The assessors in Boston are unaware that there has 
been an inflation; or (2) properties have not been revalued annually as 
required by lav<. The first point can probably be dismissed and it is 
true that assessments often lag behind price level changes. In periods 
of price level stability this problem would not arise. However, the time 
elapsed between some of Boston's property valuations is twenty to thirty 
20 years. One hypothesis which suggests itself is that the assessors in 
Boston have reassessed properties only when some apparent change in the 
status of the property has compelled them to do so. 
One could really not expect to find much consistency in exempt valu-
ations where there is not :much in those valuations for taxable properties. 
Roswell G. Townsend in a National Tax Journal paper entit:Led 11 Inequalities 
of' Residential Property Taxation in Metropolitan Boston 11 notes that even 
though residential properties in suburban communities are relatively more 
heterogeneous than residential properties in the city of Boston, the assess-
ments in Boston show a much greater lack of uniformity in individual prop-
21 perty assessment when compared w·ith suburban assessments. 
20The similarity of valuations over a twenty year period :may be be-
cause depreciation accounts for the balancing of price level changes over 
the years. Ho\vever, this seems very unlikely. 
21The average deviation from the assessment to sales ratio in Boston 
was ,30.8% in 1951 as compared to 18 to 19% in three suburban areas. He 
attributes the difficulties to (1). quality of assessors, (2) the ward 
system, (.3) the process of assessment, and (4) other factors not readily 
apparent. He does not elucidate on any of these points. QR. cit., pp. 
,361 et seq.. 
._, 
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The conclusion which forces itself on anyone examining the data is 
that a complete revaluation of exempt property here would be fruitless 
because there appears to be no systematic i'lay of classifying all of the 
properties. Furthermore, the objective of revaluation is to explain the 
variation in the subsidies. When one considers that assessments on both 
exempt and taxable property probably like Topsy "just growed 11 , the devel-
opment of a functional relationship between the subsidies and some varia~ 
ble not related to property values (such as an index of quality) would 
be like a correlation between the appearance of storks and the b~rth rate: 
not only is such a correlation unlikely to occur, but it would be meaning-
less if it did. 
There is ample support to the assertion that Boston's assessment pro-
cedures are very erratic. A series of articles in the Christian Science 
Monitor in 1954 claimed that a substantial part of Boston's $21~000,000 
deficit accumulated in the seven years prior to~l954 can be attributed 
to the practice of assigning valuations, permitting tax abatements ~:be­
cause the valuations were in error, and then reassi~ing the same valua-
tions that were judged to be inequitable. This continually required in-
terest payments on the taxes abated. The lack of coordination between 
the individuals responsible for setting the valuations and those who were 
responsible for finally judging them seems to be the basis for an extreme-
ly casual way for the city to borrow funds and one which would hardly 
seem to inspire confi~ence in the city's fiscal management. As a result 
of these disclosures, all abatements must be published in the Boston City 
Record now. The interested public at least has the opportunity to know 
22 details of' abatements today_. 
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One might utend to take criticism of' the consistency of' Boston's as-
sessments less seriously if' this were the f'irst or only time that criti-
cisms had been made. However, the chaos is well documented and is ad-
mitted by city of'f'icials. Former Mayor Hynes had a study of' assessments 
started on all commercial, industrial, and multi-unit (f'our units or 
more) residential property in the city. Another, presumably more compre-
hensive, study has been initiated by Mayor Collins of' the entire property 
tax assessment problem.23 
All these considerations have an important bearing on the discussion 
of' tax exemption subsidies. Even though the chaotic conglomeration of' 
inf'ormation prohibits much in the way of' sensible generalizations concern-
ing property tax exemptions as a subsidy, the various f'actors which have 
been described do much to explain why the subsidies based on existing 
valuations are what they are. 
When the appropriateness of' valuations f'or both taxable and exempt 
property is considered, it becomes doubtf'ul whether any of' the total valu-
ation f'igures f'or the city of' Boston have much meaning. Besides the in-
f'lated values f'or some .exempt property, assessment'S on some taxable:;;prop• 
erties been too high a~nually to be equitable and were abated annually, 
while some valuations havenrt changed in twenty f'ive or thirty years. 
22Robert 0. Bergenheim, The Millstone 
Gabriel F. Piedmonte, 1954). 
23Boston Globe, March 5, 1961, 58:5. 
Around Boston 1 s Neck (Boston: 
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Consider the implications of a possible fifty or seventy five per cent 
of the property owned by a school or schools being built after the war. 
The vaulations reported would be double those on taxable properties be-
cause the sales price to a9sessment valuation ratio is ignored. They 
would also be double the valuation of exempt properties bu$1t before the 
war because of price changes. The valuation on a postwar built exempt 
property would be quadruple that on a prewar property bumlt or!ginally 
for a taxable function in some instances. 
While there is no doubt that exempt educational property can con-
ceivably be a problem of some magnitude in considering the revenue pot~n­
tial of the property tax base, there is some real doubt whether there is 
any knov1ledge to be gained concerning the cost of hosting educational 
institutions from the data that is available on Boston. A city with zero 
knowledge of the costs is not much worse off. 
There is no way of knowing whether Boston is benefiting by the 
amount.that it is giving up. Since the estimate of what is being fore-
gone is ~pt to be so unrepresentative of what is actually being foegone, 
the very subjective task of estimating the gains to society is practically 
pointless. However, there are a number of possible total valuations. 
Assuming that price level changes have been consistently ignored, edu-
cational property built originally for that purpose before the war would 
probably be valued at lOa% of full value. The change in price levels 
would reduce total valuations almost in half so that if these assumptions 
applied to all property, the tot~l valuation of $600,000 would be a reason-
able approximation. If all property \'lere built after the war, again spe-
cifically for education and valued at loa%.··· of true value, the total value 
of property should, on the basis of the current sales price to assessment 
ratio becone half of the figure that is reported here, or $300,000. 
Assuming "Yhat all property were built before the war L.originally 
for noneducational purposes and valued at a sales price to assessment 
ratio of 50%, the valuation today should, because of price level changes, 
be about double the total reported or $1,200,000. If built after the 
war, again for some taxable function, and assessed at a sales price to 
assessment ratio of about fifty per cent, then the total of $600,000 would 
again be a reasonable approximation. The range of possible valuations 
extends from what is probably an absolute minimum of $300,000 to a prob-
able maximum of $1,200,000. These generalizations are net of all other 
factors such as appreciation or depreciation. It is only because each 
of the above possibilities could occur with respect to any individual 
piece of property that more precise generalizations cannot be made. 
It might be felt by some that the benefits from the schools' being 
here and the costs to the city of exempting them from taxation are in a 
tenuous balance. 24 Mayor Collins has suggested the notion of the sewage 
tax and he has suggested that the schools adopt a policy of in lieu pay-
24For all the criticism there is one variety as described in Chap. 
~~ which does not seem to apply to Boston. This is the exemption of 
property on the basis of ownership rather than function. Many Boston 
schools own property l.Yhich is wholly or partially used for profit pur-
poses. The assessors have not exempted this property from taxation, or 
have allowed only partial exemptions where the property is used ·c::for 
both profit and nonprofit activity. For example, the Myles Standish 
dormitory has a number of shops in the ground floor. The bulk ·of the 
valuation is exempt, but recognition is made of the profitmaking ren-
tals from these shops. 
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menta to the city such as the practice followed by Harvard, Radcliffe, 
and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge. Former 
Mayor Hynes urged schools to move into low value areas so that not so 
much revenue would be foregone by the city until the school itself had 
contributed to the improvement of the neighborhood. 
As far as the populace is concerned, it was suggested in Chapter ii 
that people are not fools and are not indifferent to taxes. This obser-
vation, of course, applies to people in Boston as well. However, Profes-
sor Murray Levin of Boston University's Government Department has pre-
pared a very interesting thesis entitled The Alienated Voter. This paper 
argues that the outcome of a recent Boston election was not related to 
the desirability of one candidate over another, but was a direct result 
of a feeling of hopelessness and helplessness on the part of the voters. 
People who are immobile in Boston talce what they can get for political 
leadership. Also, they might well feel that little can be done to improve 
Boston t s fiscal position until there is a substantive change in political 
organization. 
While extremely high taxes and the effects of a corrupt political 
history are not the only reasons, it might reasonably be suspected that 
the nearly 15% of Boston1 s 1950 population which emigrated from the cen-
tral city during the last decade were motivated to some extent by high 
taxes and governmental mismanagement. A taste for suburban living is im-
portant, of course, as are those additional costs of living in the central 
city such as automobile insurance; but the fact that only three other 
United States central cities declined in population more than Boston sug-
gests that there are peculiarly local circumstances in each case. Unless 
there are many cities tied fo~ first place in percentage decline, there 
is an inference that local conditions are operative. The temptation to 
blame taxation for Boston 1 s decline is strong, but an analysis of all 
other factors is necessary before such an assertion can be made. 
This chapter represented an attempt to show how much subsidy goes 
to individual students of the property tax exempt institutions of higher 
education in Boston. The object was to bring out generalizations con-
cerning tax exemption subsidies. It was found that a number of factors 
in respect to the data on Boston .seem to make the calculations of per 
student subsidies of uncertain accuracy. These are the elements of error 
which are apt to change the ranks of full time equivalent students, tui-
tions, or expenditures per student. More important is the quality oi' as-
sessment data for exempt properties. These figures are a mixture of values 
from periods with different price levels and a mixture of different sales 
price to assessment ratio valuations. The most critical observation is 
that valuations on taxable properties are probably in a not much b.etter 
state. 
If one could only believe that existing assessments would apply in 
the absence of exemptions, it could be asserted that there is little re-
lation between the subsidies and quality of educational output. The sub-
sidies could be considered relatively inefficient if it could also be 
shown that some other equally feasible alternative could be designed to 
be more substantially related to educational quality. On the other hand, 
if it could be demonstrated that in comparison with some alternative the 
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prpperty tax"is not so regressive, then the impact of the distribution 
of the subsidy upon the distribution of income could be regarded almost 
as a matter of indifference. 25 
However, there is ample justification for the study of the efficien-
cy and equity aspects of the subsidies based on existing valuations, even 
if the generalizations are not clear. For one thing, there is no feasible 
alternative but to use them short of literally reassessing every piece 
of exempt property in the city oneself. This requires a professional com-
petence at assessing which cannot be presumed. Furtheli]llore, a st.udy of 
this sort, while it does not show definitely the presence or absence of 
a relationship between the property factor of production and educational 
quality or the distribution of income does bring out the substantial 
lack of information concerning these relationships and it emphasizes the 
condition of Boston 1 s assessments once again. 
In respect to the subsidies themselves, two interesting conjectures 
can be made. The first is that should it ever be decided by the citizens 
of the state to amend the constitution in order to tax educational prop-
erty, there would undoubtedly be a complete revaluation of all exempt prop-
erty in order to insure that these assessments would be equitable. To be 
sure, there is always the possibility that existing assessments on exempt 
property might be used, but it is Lmreasonable to expect that the officers 
responsible for the finances of these schools would tolerate existing as-
sessments for long. The other possibility is some sort of impost such as 
25unless in the unlikely event that tax exemption policy were 
specifically regarded as a means of redistributing income. 
sewage usage tax would be levied which would presumably be related to 
the value of properties. In this context, this would be a i~uasi prop-
erty tax and could be instituted by the city without a constitutional 
amendment. It is to be hoped that this second !!lternative would only be 
implemented after some sort of revaluation also. 
When one considers the observations which have been developed and 
realizes that even though Massachusetts communities go through the formal-
ity of making valuations for exempt properties, it should be pretty well 
affirmed that too little is known about tax exemption subsidies in the 
majority of United States communities where no valuations are even attemp-
ted. If Boston were a better model for tax exemption studies, it would 
be interesting to make generalizations concerning this subsidy policy and 
impute these general characteristics to other cities. Hovrever, alterna-
tive arrangements for educational subsidization including the existing 
tax exemptions can still be considered without a good model on which to 
base the discussion by making various assumptions concerning these prac-
tices for the country as a whole. 
CHAPTER IV ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES . TO TAX EXEMPTION SUBSIDIES 
On the basis of the evidence that has been collected concerning 
tax exemption subsidies in the city of Boston~ little can be said concern-
ing the real cost of exempting educational property from local real pro= 
perty taxes. The impression that is derived, however, is that the city 
has exempted all educational property from taxation which is devoted to 
(or is a complement to) educational production, without explicit recogni-
tion, nor perhaps cognizance of, the principles of compensation. The sub-
sidies, however different they rray. be from those calculated in this pa.,.. 
per, might very well not bear a close ~elationship to the social gains 
of the educational production. Our forefathers recognized the public in-
terest element in higher education and this is responsible for the long 
established practice of tax exemptions. That property was considered to 
be a sufficiently important factor of educational production in colobial 
times to warrant this type of subsidy, does not mean that property tax 
exemptions are an appropriate way of subsidizing education today. 
The purpose of this chapter will be to discuss alternative forms 
of this subsidy •. It is well to know that such valuations which may 
exist on exempt property may be wholly inappropriate, particularly in a 
community where there is. an alleged problem stemming from the exemption. 
of property from taxation~ Public decisions based on existing valuations 
might easily be the wrong decisions and the magnitude of the costs could 
easily beco~ a political football. 
There seemi.1 to be three general categories of alternatives which 
could reasonably be considered. The first category is in terms of ex~ 
tremes. The property tax exemption should be abolished or it should 
continue to be granted in exactly the same way as it has been for genera-
tions. The second category of alternative suggests modifications of ex= 
isting ar~angements but modifications which generally con~orm closely to 
the existing institutional arrangements. Here, the schools, for the 
most part, take the initiative and build skyscrapers into the air; spread 
out into relatively low value areas; make contributions to the city in 
lieu of tax payments;-or follow a policy which would be any combination 
of these three. The last category considers the possibility of another 
level of government assuming greater responsibility for subsidizing edu-
cation as an alternative to local government subsidization. Thus the 
tax bases of state and federal governments plus whatever administration 
a transfer of responsibility for subsidization might entail can also be 
regarded as 'lalternatives. 
In all likelihood, neither of the alternatives in the first cate-
gory is likely to ever come about. Abolishing the subsidy without a 
well constructed alternative is the less likely of the two possibilities. 
Nor should it be abolished, it would seem. To eliminate an alternative 
without substituting some other and presumably better alternative would 
not be constructive. 
On the other hand, a completely permissive attitude towards the 
physical expansion of schools would probably be not much more desirable; 
unless, of course, those who are going to have to pay the resulting in-
creases in taxes are thoroughly convinced of the benefits. If other 
cities are like Boston, it may be well to expect a certain amount o£ re• 
-
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straint will be exercised against unlimited expansion. 
If' an undue amount of' stress is put on the desirability of' educa= 
tional production at higher levels of' government, city administrators 
and the citizens in some cities might become reluctant to exert restraint 
f'or f'ear of' public opinion in general and yet f'eel that the city is unable 
to forego additional revenue.l 
However, there are too many more moderate alternatives, some of' 
which have alre~dy been implemented, to worry greatly 1:Jabout extremes. 
These compromises represent an assuming of' initiative by the schools 
themselves as integral parts of' the connnunity with inst.itutional person-
alities concerned with the general welfare. 
The simplest way of avoiding extensive land use is to not use land. 
The skyscraper classroom or dormitory building may not appeal to every= 
one•s taste, but where there is a physical limitation on land area, build-
ing into the sky is of'ten a simple solution. Different circumstances "'1 
will dictate the desirability of skyscr_apers. Small or poor colleges, 
or colleges in rural environment, may not wish, need, or be ~ble to ac• 
complish this alternative. However, this would seem to be an excellent 
solution to the problem of' the expanding urban university where physi-
cal space is at a pre~um. Nor will all cities offer the problem Boston 
has. Skyscrapers here are relatively much more expensive because large 
parts of the city are made of fill and extra ashorings are required to 
1 It is interesting to note that public interest in education seems 
to have shifted from complacency to a zealous demand which, in the long 
run, might be just as inappropriate as the complacency. 
-I -~~----- - - - - - - - -~- - -- - ~~ - --- -- -~- - - - ~ - - ~-- -
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prevent buildings from sinking into the earth. 
Another similar alternative which might be employed, either con-
currently or in a build into the sky program, would be for the college 
to spread out into low value areas. It is felt, for example, by people 
at Boston University, that the displacement of used car lots along Com-
monwealth Avenue by the University's modern Gothic architecture is a de-
cided improvement. There are certainly other areas in Boston which could 
stand improvement and if it were technically feasible to spread the 
schools into these areas, the benefits might well exceed the costs sub-
stantially. There are undoubtedly areas in nearly all cities which 
could be similarly enhanced by new buildings. 
Another area for Boston schools to explore and which could be ex-
plored by the schools in other cities which find themselves in similar 
geographical circpmstances is the expansion into semirural and rural areas 
around the city. One or another of Boston's schools could have a par-
ticularly unique opportunity, if it were financially possible to set up 
campus on Route 128. For example, Boston University could produce near-
ly all the education necessary for resident undergraduate students at 
such~campus; graduate students and commuting students2 could be accommo-
dated at the downtown campus. There is the inference that Boston College 
administrators may have been thinking along these lines from the fact that 
so few Boston College students now use intown facilities.) 
2some of the latter 1 s pa~ents are paying the property tax, it should 
be note,d. 
-- ·~~ 3 _,,; __ 
This idea of suburban campuses was suggested by E. J. Burtt, Jr., 
Chairman of the Economics Department of the Boston University College 
of Liberal Arts. 
72 
The last alternative which ~its into the category o~ the schools 
t~ing the initiative in the moderate attempt to alleviate the city's 
property tax e~~ort also originated in the Boston area. Actually, the 
concept o~ in lieu payments to the city ~or tax exemption originated in 
Cambridge around 1928.4 
Harvard, Radcliffe, and the Massachusetts Institute o~ Technology 
were the ~irst and to date the only known schools in the country which 
make payments to a city. Some ~raction o~ the value o~ property newly 
acquired is paid to the city ~or a number o~ years. This procedure 
could perhaps be construed as a hedge against municipal inter~erence, 
but since there is as much evidence to suggest civic spiritedness as 
there is ~or hedging it seems pre~erable to attribute it to the ~ormer 
characteristic. 
All these alternatives have been urged upoq the schools in Boston 
either by Mayor Collins or by ~ormer Mayor Hynes. As yet, there has 
been no action taken on in lieu payments. Al~ernatives such as those 
~.-
in this category represent-what may be substantial cost to the schools. 
Skyscrapers, and newconstruction in low valued areas, or in lieu pay-
ments to the city might almost be interpreted as an admission by the 
schools that their contribution to the social product is not so great as 
their cost. It may be, however, that an explicit recognition o~ social 
responsibility by the schools plus only nominal contributions to the 
city by pursuing one or a combination o~ these alternatives would be bet~ 
4Lotter ~rom Joseph J. Snyder, Vice-President and Treasurer o~ 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, J~e 7, 196o. 
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ter in terms of public relations than a continued reassertion of the so-
cial gains of education to the community. It would seem that there would 
be lots less opportunity for public contention if the schools could coun-
ter criticism with a dollar measure of their civic responsibility. These 
alternatives also ~offer the advantages of leaving responsible educa-
tional leaders to determine the quantity of subsidization. However~ 
there is ·nothing in any of the alternatives considered to this point 
which would necessarily insure that the subsidies be either efficient or 
consonant with social value judgments regarding the distribution of in-
come. Also there would be hardly any way of determining whether or not 
there was a functional relationship between property values (which might 
well be incorrectly reported) and the quantity of subsidization. It 
• there is to be no relationship between property values and the subsidy, 
it would seem that a direct subsidy paid to the school for distribution 
to the students, while the city taxes the school, would be a far less 
cumbersome technique of municipal subsidization. This, of course, brings 
one back to the idea of abolishing the subsidy, but if cities were to 
dole out the subsidy or cooperate with the schools in determining its 
quantity, there would at least be an explicit valuation of the worth of 
education, regardless of the particular technique of subsidization emP 
ployed. For example, assume that the city does not tax the schools. The 
schools~ however, in response to public (perhaps editorial) pressure, 
-
start paying in lieu of taxes to the city and/or view the cost of adding 
extra stories to their larger buildings. The subsidy acc~uing to stu-
••• 
dents is reduced and the relation of the subsidy to property values is 
apt to be reduced as well. If there is to be little relationship between 
property values and per student subsidies, then it would seem that the 
schools might as well pay taxes and receive their bou~ties from the city 
in accordance with the judgment of (elected) city officials. This way 
" 
the public would ultimately estimate the worth of the schools. 
The alternatives which have been considered to this point all assume 
that the cities themselves.wish to subsidize education locally. In Mas-
sachusetts, it is the state constitution which provides that certain in= 
stitutions be exempt. There is a sufficient time lapse between consti-
tutional amendments, it 1-lould seem, for local residents to change their 
views about such laws. If only a few cities have a problem from fore-
gone revenue, there will be little incentive to support the city with a 
problem, and remove the exemptions, especially when one considers how 
firmly entren~hed the tradition of exempting schools has become. 
The local community has become a less important level of government 
in recent years than it was, say, a generation ago. The increasing ~ 
portance of the federal government espe:cially in its economic responsi-
bilities and its economic cooperation with the states makes the economic 
responsibilities of local governments seem slight in comparison. In 
fact, the proportions of income going to taxes of various sorts reflects 
the growing relative importance of the federal income tax and the decli-
ning relative l:mportance of the local property}tax. It is suggested, in 
view of the increasing tendency of the federal government to absorb re-
sponsibility in the economic realm, that an alternative to local property 
tax exemptions might be provided by the higher level of government.5 
5This proposal was suggested by Pro;fessor John J. Hughes of the 
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This alternative is advanced without a lengthy discussion of the ad= 
ditional alternative of the possibility of state governments assuming 
the responsibility for educational subsidization because state govern-
ments' fiscal structures are more similar to local systems and it is one 
of the advantages of the federal structure which recommends changing the 
existing order of things. 
The advantages of a federal subsidy to education which would be sinul<= 
lar to local property tax exemptions can be described by demonstrating 
how it would be implemented. The disadvan~Ages will be considered as ·well. 
Assume a decision is made to increase federal subsidies to education. 
Payments will be made by the federal government to local governments 
which would accurately represent the value of the buildings. This would 
please those who are firm in the belief that educational property is a 
sufficiently important factor of production to be exempt from taxation. 
It would also provide for the first time in history data on a nationwide 
basis which would be sufficient to determine whether or not property ia 
in fact an important factor of production in determining the quality of 
educational output. 
The federal government would announce that it intended to subsidize 
education by making payments directly to local governments on the basis 
of asse~sed valuations for the property of higher educational institutions. 
These payments would be made provided that local govern~nts, perhaps in 
coqperation with the schools, could demonstrate that the values reported 
Economics Department of the Boston University College of Liberal Arta •. 
were appropriate to the real values of the schools. Any objective measure 
of the full and fair market value of the buildings would be acceptable 
if these values were consistent with one another and with similar pro= 
perties throughout the country.6 
There may be a few communities where existing valuations would be 
. ' . 
acceptable, or could be made acceptable by adjustment to the sales price 
to assessment valuation. It is also possible to literally a$sess all of 
the properties individually. However, for most cities, there is no data 
available and where some figures are, they may like Boston's be woefully 
inappropriate. It would not, however, be a large problem to get fairly 
consistent valuations which would be objectively acceptable. Most build-
ings will be insured against fire loss. All that is necessary is to ad-
just (if this should be necessary) the dollar values which buildings are 
insured for to a figure representing the cost of rebuilding the buildings.7 
For example, many buildings are insured for somewhat less than the 
cost of rebuilding them. This disc~ges arson. The school administra-
tors and city authorities should be able to work out a market value for 
the buildings using the insurance companies• underwriting rules as a 
guide. This would effectively prevent any schools in any community or 
6Full and fair market value need not be the only measure of value. 
Voters might decide that buildings should be subsidized at some frac-
tion of full market value. Full market value or some similar criterion: 
should probably be used, however, as an index. 
70ities would have an incentive to encourage an increase in the 
amount of fire insurance schools have as much as possible. However, 
the cost of the insurance and the underwriting criteria of t}le insu-
rance companies would be a deterrent to much expansion of insured 
values. 
Tl! 
any community from reporting an overvaluation. It would also forestall 
criticism of the program stemming from the possibility that assessors 
employed by the federal government were usurping a mun~cipal government 
prerogative. 
The pro~.lem of assessing vacant lots must also be considered. 
These are particularly important in a congested urban area and there will 
be no fire insurance data to use as a guide. However, in those commu~ 
nities where the value and importance of a vacant lot are apt to be 
greatest, there is also apt to be the most objective criteria for de-
termining their value. Vacant lots are rented for parking; and while 
the downtown parking lot often earns a higher rent than the one on the 
margin of the community, an average value for a vacant lot can be compu-
ted which would represent its commercial opportunity cost and which on 
the basis of deviations from the average would take account for differences 
in local parking rates. These valuations could be applied not only to 
parking lots themselves but to skating rinks, ;?:tennis courts, or areas 
of grassy green campus. 
Of course, there will be problems. The solid concrete stadium will 
probably not be insured for very much of its worth against fire. Also, 
the irreplaceable colonial building (which could be prohibitively expen-
sive to insure against fire for anything near its worth) belonging to a 
college and which has been on the same location since before the Revolu-
tion, will offer a similar problem. Such buildings offer valuation prob-
lems anyway, so that a reasonable effort to judge their values, while 
this may fall short of perfection, would seem to be preferable to the 
• 
• 
•• 
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existing situation which assumes that they ar.e worth something to edu-
cational production while no one has the slightest idea how much. 
The cost or such a program to income taxpayers would be substan-
tial. Assume that the estimate or rorego.ne revenue ror Boston is ap-
propriate or at worst is a slightly high estimate. 8 It is also rairly 
sare to assume that there is probably no city which has a higher tax 
rate than Boston.9 Thererore, if the cost or subsidizing Boston 1 s edu-
cational institutions would be less than $600,000, the co~t or subsidi-
zing ten similarly situated cities (and these are high assumptions) 
would be $6,000,000. One hundred cities like Boston would cost sixty 
million dollars. 10 
There will, rortunate~y, not be one hundred cities like Boston. 
However, there is an unknown number or small communities which have 
one or more exempt institutions and which will tend to make the bill 
larger than it v-rould be if only cities which were in some way compara-
ble to Boston were considered. 
Assuming, however, $60,000,000 as an estimate of the roregone reve-
8This assumes that the dollar value or newly constructed post-
war buildings which were built specifically ror educational production 
outweigh those buildings which were built berore the war and also 
those previously nonexempt buildings which are valued at the sales 
price to assessment ratio. 
9Boston• s tax rate is 4;5.5% higher than the second highest tax 
rate or twenty cities studied by the Greater Boston Read Estate Board, 
A Stud;y: and Analysis or Revenue Structures in Boston and Comparable 
American Cities. 
10 Here the average property tax rate might be more appropriate but 
this is not available and a maximum assumption is desired. 
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nue, there will also be an additional administrative cost. About one i 
-
hundred coordinators of information to be emplo~ed by the federal govern-
ment and who would earn less than ten thousand dollars a year, would 
·-
probably be required.ll Another million dollars would probably be 
required. In view of the generous assumptions regarding the revenue 
foregone this would seem to be adequate for extra administrative costs.12 
A sixty 2~e million dollar (or less) bill to income taxpayers will 
have to be justified by some considerable advantages. There are substan-
tial advantages to such an alternative and these advantages can be ex-
pressed in terms of efficiency and equity considerations. The following 
arguments suggest that the world as it is cannot be even second best 
while this alternative exists untried. If the federal government were 
to make payments to. communities, the only requirement for which is that 
the schools and the communities cooperate to provide consistently based 
valuations (as on fire insurance values, as discussed) a whole body of 
data would be comp~led which could be used to test the relationship be-
tween per student subsidies and the quality of education. Any number o£ 
quality indices might be used, other than one which is derived £rom pro-
11 •• 
Boston intends to pay full time assessors $7700 per annum as 
as the most recent assessment department overhaul is accomplished. 
ton Globe, March 5, 1961, 8:2. 
soon 
Bos-
12 ' d t One hundred ~oor ina ora seems enough since school administrators 
will be cooperating in this program because it will be in the best in-
terests of the school to provide as substantial evidence as possible. 
This could be insured by making formal requirements concerning the valu-
ation data, before a school-became qualified for valuation. This will 
represent a cost to the schools of course, but by the same to~en school~ 
will have a reduction in their public relations budgets, particularly 
at those times when the purchase of another parcel of property is desired. 
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perty values. I£ it were £ound, £or example, that the size of schools 
(in terms of dollar values o£ properties) was not a good index o£ qua-
lity, then this program could be replaced by still another subsidy in 
another experiment to determine the relationship between the other sub-
sidy and educational quality. 
It would seem that such an experiment might well be tried at the 
state level so that £i£ty different versions of the subsidy program 
could be tested. However, the publicity o£ a federal experiment would 
seem desirable:' in it se 1£. Furthermore, there is a question as to the 
relative appropriateness of the state or local government as an agent 
for educational subsidization. To be sure, states and communities de-
rive benefits from educated citizens. However, the nation as a whole 
is also deriving many benefits from them, as well as benefits wnch are 
not accruing to smaller units of government. Students cross state and· 
local boundaries without regard:~·· ··for whoe~i'Or it is tha.t is subsidizing 
them. While the benefits from subsidizing education may cancel out as 
between one community or state and another, they may just as well not 
cancel· out, but the nation seldom loses its educational output no mat-
ter where educated individuals choose to live.l3 
Furthermore, the nation benefits £rom the education of foreign stu-
i;ents such as the Aga Khan and the students he has aided in terms of cul-
tural ex~ha~g,. The nation bene£its £rom having regions which are high-
ly specialized if this specialization actually improves the quality of 
l)There are always a few expatriates,of course. 
81 
education or limits unnecessary duplication of' facilities. It seems a 
reasonable assumption that this regional specialization could lead to 
substantial economies of' scale. 
If' these considerations in respect to ef'f'iciency, both economic 
and technical, were not a sufficient arg~ent f'or federal rather than 
state or local subsidization, considerations of equity could also be 
called upon f'or support of' the argument. Although a growing number of' 
states are turning to the personal income tax, essentially most of' the 
taxes employed by states and local governments can be suspected of re-
gressivity. Of' course, a number of' studies have f·shown some sales taxes 
not to be regressive and there is some uncertainty always as to how "badll 
local property taxes are. However, it is not certain that all state and 
local tax systems are proportional or progressive while it is certain 
that the federal income tax is progressive and if it should not be suf-
ficiently progressive to redistribute income according to social value 
judgments at any particular point in time, this is not because there is 
an inherent bias in it towards regressivity. In terms of' redistributing 
thcome, society is reasonably certain that a personal income tax will re-
distribute income accdrding to society1 s intentions and how much it does 
so will depend upon the particular rates society selects. For any 
sales or property tax, an empirical study of' its incidence is ne~ssary 
to show that at any given time and place the particular tax in question 
is or is not progressive, regressive, or proportional. Sales and proper-
ty taxes need more frequent investigation to assure they are having an 
effect on the income distribution which was intended. 
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In addition to these ~quity considerations, it must also be remem_.o. 
bered that the extra cost to taxpayers should not be great since a new 
subsidization expenditure is not involved. Theoretically, the cost of' 
having the federal government make payments to the cities f'or the exemp-
tion of' educational buildings f'rom taxation should be just equal to the 
cost which ·:eity property users·are now contributing f'or this subsidy. 
If' perfect valuations existed now, the on;Ly cost Wol,lld be one of' admini-
stration since the national aggregate property tax bill would decrease 
by the increase in the national aggregate personal income tax bill. The 
dif'f'erence between the two approaches, aside f'rom possible extra adminis-
trative charges, is essentially in the incidence of' the taxation burden. 
Furthermore, the f'iscal structure of' the federal government is substan-
tially more elastic than those of' state and local governments. The feder-
al budget need not be balanced annually in order to insure the credit 
standing of' the government. The credit'~ of' state and local governments 
is of' a·dif'f'erent nature and their budgets must be in balance more frequent-
ly in order to maintain credit. 
There may well be objections to such a program which might be taken. 
The principal objection would be that many communities benefit f'rom edu-
cation quite apart f'rom the general benefits accruing to the nation. This 
is perfectly f'ine. The program need not be an all or nothing situation. 
If' it is decided (and political bodies make such decisions daily) that 
a city or cities derives some proportion of' the benefits f'rom the schools, 
let the cities absorb the cost f'or the proportion. A.ll of' the advantA~ges 
• 
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of consistent valuation and predictable tax indidence can still be ob-
tained if the federal(:;government pays only, say~ f'if'ty per cent of the 
value of the buildings (f'or the fifty per cent paid)• 
Then too, such a program might be criticized on the grounds that it 
represents another federal intrusion into the economic affairs of local 
governments. This i.s::true in a sense; but it should be noted that inde= 
pendent thinking cities do not seem averse to federal expenditures for 
redevelopment or flood control. Also the citizens in communities which 
would receive relatively little would not be so enthusiastic as those in 
cities like Boston which would presumably receive relatively more. 
However, in the management of the important business of government, 
some are often made worse off in order to make others better of'f. If it 
is believed f'or example that the rich are those who should subsidize edu-
cation because of equity considerations or because, in e:ff'iciency terms, 
they benefit from educational production more (either by consuming more 
education or by being remunerated more by educational production), wouldn 1 t 
it be~better to have the rich of all communities support education througn 
progressive income taxes than leave both efficiency and equity considera= 
tions entirely to the vagaries of local property taxation? Nor is there 
any evidence to suggest that local governments can provide subsidization 
as well as, much less better than, the federal government. Every bit of 
existing evidence in respect to this subsidy would seem to indicate the 
exact opposite • 
Then there is the problem of concern about federal government con-
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trol of education (and/or similar activities}, something which seems to 
- r 
be popularly manifested Whenever aid is mentioned. A case in point is 
the refusal of some colleges to participate in the National Defense Edu-
cation Act of 1958 because of the loyalty oath requirement. The colleges 
were 11right 11 in a sense, for balking at the notion of a loyalty oath for 
fear that loyalty oaths might tend to discourage individuals from free 
and objective discussion. On the other hand, the federal government has 
a responsibility to taxpayers not to give money to enemies of the public. 
This type of conflict and the general problem of control should not arise. 
in a property subsidy. The individual student, professor, or administra-
tor is sufficiently distant from the government not to be influenced, it 
would seem, to any substantial extent. Furthermore, the type of contrel 
that would be exerted would be of a sort that should reasonably prompt 
a good many revaluations of assessment systems. If there are many other 
cities like Boston, this would probably be all to the good. 
One last problem needs mentioning. This is the old story of sepa-
ration of church and state. Not so much contention exists concerning 
subsidies for religiously sponsored colleges as is aroused by the pros~ 
pact of subsidizing parochial elementary and secondary schools. How-
ever, it is almost certain that someone will bemoan the mixing of church 
and state if ~hurch sponsored schools are to be included in this pelicy. 
It is difficult to see why the nature of church and government relations 
has to change simply because the level of government proyiding the sub-
sidy has changed. 
Such a program also has so~ precedence. Communities ho~ting feder-
al installations receive in lieu of' tax payments from the federal gov-
ernment f'or the educational facilities the f'ed•ral government requires. 
A bill was passed in the Senate ~~in May bf' 1960 which was introduced by 
Senator Humphrey of' Minnesota to have the federal government make in 
lieu of' payments to cities for the general property it possessed as 
exempt f'rom local property taxation. Senator Bush of' Connecticut made 
these comments to the Senate; 
Mr. President, we aFe already doing this in connec~ 
tion with payments in lieu of' taxes to communities 
to support education, where a heavy overload has 
been created by federal installation. I see no 
dif'f'erence at all between making a grant-in-aid 
payment in lieu of' taxes to a community for edu-
cation and making such a contribution for the roads 
that lead to the school and for police and fire 
protection with relation to these centers, and to 
take care of other needs of' the community, pro-
portionately with respect to t~a property belong-
ing to the Federal Government. 
The program which Senator Humphrey designed and which passed in the 
Senate did not apparently have a valuation technique associated with it. 
The policy for subsidizing education suggested here would ultimately 
permit reasonably accurate computations as to how much any given city's 
property tax rate should declin!5 once the policy is well established •. 
It would seem that a policy good enough to support education of' a 
special nature and which is good enough (at least f'or the Senate) f'or 
general government functions should be good enough f'or federal support 
14 Senate Bill S-910. U. S., 
Sess., 1960, CVI, ('Part 8, 10122. 
Congressional Record, 86th Gong., 2d 
It did not pa~s in the House. 
15or an estimate of' how much th~ tax rate will not increase~ for 
any city, because of' this policy in the future. 
.-
( 
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to higher education in general. This of course is only true if federal 
support for higher education is what the American people really want. 
The following observations indicate that federal aid could be desirable: 
In the past, Americans have preferred to accom-
plish.the financing of most non-defense facilities 
and services at the state and local level. But 
state and local tax systems are in some re;specte 
archaic and it is. very difficult to keep the reve-
nues from this source growing in step with th~ 
economy or with growing demand for governmental ser-
vices which an expanding economy creates. This is 
due partly to the excessive dependence of state and 
local revenues--particularly the latter--upon the 
real property tax, which is notably laggard in its 
response to rising income and it is due partly to 
the fact that state and local governments are re-
luctant to extend their taxing systems for fear 
of placing their communities or states at a com~ 
petitive disadvantage relative to other areas. 
It is this weakness in the state and local 
taxing systems more than anything else that gives 
rise to current proposals for increased federal 
support of education. For those who wish to re-
sist or postpone the resort to Federal funds and at 
the same time not constrict edu(!ational services there - -
seems to be only one alternative; a thorough, pain-
ful, politically ~ourageous overhaul of state and lo-
cal tax systems.l0 .· 
How long the public will wait for the tax reform that 1:/illf[.O":P:~~ 
contends is necessary is unknown. In the meantime, Sputnik has created 
a clamor for more education (particularly scientific). Everyday strap 
hanging subway riders are confronted at eye level with 11 Support the Ool-
lege of Your Choice--Now. College enrollments are going to double by 
1970. 11 Of course, nearly everything else: population, income, labor 
force, etc., are going to grow in reasonable proportions as well. Lest 
l6The Pursuit of Excellence: Education and the Future of America 
(Garden City·, New York: Double~ay, 1958), pp:-.31i=35 .. 
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the interest in education become a disequilibrating factor, it would 
seem that modest contributions to education should be experimented with 
first. One important advantage of federal in lieu of tax payments to 
local government is that they represent a further step in federal sub-
sidization which is sufficiently responsive to changing times without 
an abrupt all or nothing decision or commitment to a massive long range 
program of subsidization which tomorrow might reveal to be inappropriate. 
• 
CHAPTER V SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
From time to time and in a number of social contexts, the 
question of the merit of property tax exemptions as a subsidy for 
higher education has been brought up and discussed rather heatedly, 
particularly in reference to schools in Boston. It seemed that quan-
tification of the data involved would make an extremely interesting ar-
gument. It was also originally hoped that the data for Boston would 
be sufficiently meaningful to be amenable to statistical analysis, and 
that generalizations concerning Boston could be applied to many like 
cities without much diB.tort~~:O.~ Figures were collected and computed 
and the outstanding conclusion seems to be that the data compiled by 
Boston's Board of Assessors for exempt valuations might just as well 
not be computed. In fact, the evidence seems to suggest that assessed 
valuations in Boston for both taxable and exempt property are inconsis-
tent not only one with the other, but also with any uniform assessment 
criteria. If Boston 1 s assessments be equitable (and there is evidence 
they are not), then this would be a fortunate coincidence. Boston re-
presents an extremely unfortunate model for a study of property taxa-
tion or tax exemption subsidies. 
The subsidies which were computed might still be considered inter-
esting because they are so uninformative. So very little of the varia-
tion in the subsidies is explained by indi~es of educational quality or 
indices of students• families 1 incomes that the cause of the variation 
has to be left pretty much in the realm of conjecture. The quality of 
the neighborhood, at a particular point in time, and the impact of city 
assessments of' varying degrees of' technical ef'f'iciency and honesty seem 
to be the only plausible explanations f'or conditions as they exist in 
Boston. One needn't wade through many editions of' the Boston newspapers 
f'or ample documentation of' the corruption that has existed in Boston 1 s 
past. It has been suggested that political corruption in Boston and 
Massachusetts is so commonplace that the citizens don't recognize it as 
1 such any more. Also, Boston was nationally f'a:mous f'or its corrpP.tion 
in the era of' this country's history when the political operations of' 
most large city administrations were, at best, dubious.2 It would be a 
little bit surprising if' there were any consistency in assessed valua-
tiona. 
However, Boston is only a small part of' a much larger problem. Bos-
ton has problems to solve quite apart f'rom the problem of' subsidizing edu-
cation. In this respect, the material published on Boston's taxes and 
tax exemption problems has provided usef'ul examples throughout, to illus-
trate the broader case. 
The larger ef'f'ort has been to show that education should be subsi--
dized. The second chapter presented the argument that the social margi-
nal cost of' education is less than the private marginal cost. That some 
of' these arguments represented value judgments, at least to some extent, 
is explicitly recognized in Chapter iii where negative and positive ar-
guments are discussed at some length. Boston's situation would seem 
1Whipple, .£E.• cit., p. 41. 
2Levin, ~· ~., p. 41. 
• 
to provide a good deal of weight to the negative criticism of 
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Chapter 
iii, especially those which are based on public ignorance or apathy. 
However, a pub1.ic policy that m,~ght spur a city which finds itself in 
a situation like Boston 1 s to a critical revaluation of its assessments 
practices would probably be a good idea. Chapter iv represents an ar-
gument in favor of a modest increase in federal government subsidization 
of education, which would also tend to bring about examinations of as-
sessment practices. 
The trend in the past twenty-five years has been to more and grea-
ter economic responsibilities for the federal government. This is not 
an accident. The federal government is the only appropriate agency for 
the provision of many goods and services. It is able to perform a n~ 
ber of functions, which would lead to chaos if performed by state and 
local governments. It can influence the direction of public opinion and 
aid in creating the demand for more and better education. And it ~as a 
revenue potential far greater than~states or local governments. 
Of course, economies of large s~ale may run afoul of bureaucratic 
red tape. Taxation may inhibit incentives and public opinion may be 
so wooed by the prospect of one hundred million college graduates that 
the sense of proportion is lost. 
These problems are minimized with federal in lieu payments to ci-
ties. Little administration is required, income taxes increase in rela-
tion to decreases in property taxes, and education is ~ubsidized in a 
manner which it is quite reasonable to expect will be economically quite 
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efficient once exempt property valuations are put on some sort of con-
sistent basis. It might even be hoped, as noted, that cities with er-
ratic property valuations would awake to this fact and revalue all 
properties on a consistent basis. All these -objectives are accomplished 
with this policy while society manages to maintain fairly predictable 
control of the distribution of inco~a. 
It is an improvement over existing circumstances. There will be 
those who would object to such a policy on principle. It is these indi-
viduals who have a conservative estimation of the role of federal govern-
ment who are responsible for the greatest advantage of federal govern= 
ment 1 s participation in economic affairs. They keep governmental poli-
cy under the close scrutiny of public opinion. 
I. 
APPENDIX A ASSESSED VALUATIONS--· ALL EXEMPT PROPERTY 
BOSTON, MASSACHuSETTS 
Area Value 
Square of Value of' 
~ Clause Feet Land Building Total Value 
u.s.A. 1 32,947,773 41,702,200 76,302,400 118,oo4,6oo 
Comm.. of' Mass. 2 179,517,601 95,246,800 88,358,800 183,605,600 
Literary 31 30,193,826 20,158,100 66,842,500 87,000,600 
Benevolent 32 11,442,437 7,914,000 55,499,400 63,413,400 
Charitable 33 8,516,988 4,25lJ.,800 25,227,400 29,482,200 
Scientific 34 612,975 819,900 966,300 1,786,200 
Temperance 
Society 35 1,450 2.,200 3,800 6,000 
• 
Organization of' 
U. S. Veterans 5 500,899 535,600 627,300 1,162,900 
Religious 
Organizations 10 337,806 257,600 611,100 868,700 
~ . 
Religious 
Churches 11 15,299,585 12,862,900 31,078,600 43,941,500 
Cemeteries 12 37,324,763 4,595,500 563,900 4,959,400 
Special Clauses 
16,17,18,19,20,21 7,973,898 1,774,300 1,558,600 3,332,900 
Railroad 22 141,410 456,200 456,200 
Medical Service 23 19,947 / 44o,4oo 341,900 782,300 
City of' Boston 
Scho:ols A 12,243,714 6,515,400 51,561,400 58,076,800 
Fire B 948,716 861,700 3,645,000 4,506,700 
All others 0 6,215,365 1,438,200 1,440,700 2.,878;900 
All & Annex D 414,040 4,147,900 8,402,600 12,550,500 
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Area Value 
$quare o£ Value of' 
~ Clause Feet Land Building Total Valtil.e 
City of' Boston, continued 
Parks and 
Playgrounds F 94,843,303 87,457,100 6,425,000 93,882,100 
Libraries I 311,678 2,139,800 3,164,500 5,484,300 
Foreclosures J 13,738,794 3,551,400 1,595,200 5,146,600 
HousiUg 
20,667,239 84,564,900 Authority K 8,.?70,200 92,935,100 
Health L 390,1)6 656,800 1,645,700 2,302,500 
Hospitals M: ~'952,532 1,026,300 10,731,900 11,758,200 
Institutions N . 11,699,319 1,635,900 8,465,000 10,100,900 
Redevelopment 
e Authority 0 1,314,989 2,609,100 2,609;100 
Police p 297,1.34 830,400 2,969,000 \3,799,400 , .•. 
\' 
Printing R 18,830 94,200 265,800 36o,ooo 
Publishing 
Buildings s 788,035 5,772,600 6,880,100 12,652,700 
Public· Works 
Department T 8,013,589 2,565,100 3,ll0,800 5,675,900 
Welfare u 58,095 227,700 srr5,4oo 1,103;100 
Total 498,846,866 320,900,300 543,725,000 864,625,300 
e 
APPENDIX B ASSESSED VALUATION--EXEMPT HIGHER EDUCATIONAL PROPERTY 
CLAUSE 31 (LITERARY INSTITUTIONS)- AND. PARTs- oF.. CLAUSES 
ll, 22, 32, 35, 34 · BosToN, ivJ.iss.A.o:HusE:±Ts 
Area Value 
Square of' Value of' 
~ and Address Feet Land Building 
Bentley School of' 
Accounting ~ Finance 
915-921 Boylston St. 5,6oo 22,400 137,600 
925 Boylston St. 3,472 13,000 23,300 
869-871 Boylston St. 4,931 22,200 237,800 
Boston College 
126 Newbury St. 11,088 lll,200 303,800 
88,700 276,300 
South Side Comm. Ave. 156,575 39,000 1,239,000 
2601-2609 Beacon St. 2,279,266 110,000 120,000 940 -'5? .. , 7,064 ,?o,4oo 44,600 0' oo1e' St~J;~C·.;"' :j ;~ j 
45 Cooper St. 5,040 22,700 24,300 
2-3-33 Stillman St .. 6,350 25,400 39,600 
Boston Conservatory 
of' Music 
31 Hemenway 8,000 16,000 144,000 
40 Fenway 3,000 9,000 4,ooo 
32 Fenway 3,000 9,000 9,000 
26 Fenway 4,000 12,000 20,000 
24 Fenway 4,000 12,000 9,000 
Total 
Value 
160,000 
36,300 
260,000 
456,300 
415,000a 
365,000 
1,278,000 
230,000 
75,000b 
47,000 
622000 
2,0bO,OOO 
16o,ooo 
13,000 
18,000 
32,000 
21~;000 
244,ooo 
aArea figure and upper line of' figures obtained from 1959 Blue Book, p. 
409. Upper line represents total value. Lower line represents. exempt value. 
Taxable value is $50,000. 
bExempt under Clause 11, Religious Worship. 
95 
Area Value 
Square o:f Value o:f Total 
Name and Address Feet Land Building Value 
Boston School o:f 
Occupational Therapy 
7 Harcourt St. 3,549 8,000 17 ,ooo 221 000 25,000 
Boston Universitl 
399 Maverick St. -·1·' 1::: ; . '-./ 
485 Maverick St. 75;500 22;6oo 137;4oo 16o;ooo 
11 Ashburton Place 8,795 88;000 250;000 338;ooo 
6 Allston Place "T57 2;900 1~500 4;400 
8 Allston Place 1;ooo 3;ooo 2;500 5;500 
6o St. Botolph St~ 1;701 2;600 n;,4oo · • 14;ooo 
84 st. Botolph St. .3,881 11,600 38,400 50,000 
Corner 25 Blagden St. 
27 North East 
corner & 84 Ex~ter 15,300 153,000 97,000 250;000 
Exeter East 33,000 66q;ooo 206,000 866;ooo 
264 Huntington Ave. 17,074 136;6oo 188;4oo 325;000 
146 Commonwealth Ave. 3,237 8,100 10;900 19~000 
24 Mount Vernon St. 3;460 17,300 22;700 4o;ooo 
22 Mount Vernon St. 1;900 9;500 17;500 27;000 
20 Mount Vernon St. 3,468 24,300 20,700 45,000 
535 Beacon and 
459 Marlborough St. 19;601 156;800 243;200 4oo;oooc 
4-32 Ga:f:fney St. 434;813 260;200 474;800 735;000d 
1.31 Commonwealth Ave. 3;237 11;300 13;700 25;000 
251 Marlborough St. 2;968 5;900 8;100 i4;ooo 
590~626 Beacon St. 20;808 10o;ooo 1,3oo;ooo 1,4oo;ooo 
91 Bay State Road 20;925 7.3;200 676;800 75o;ooo . 
531 Beacon St. 2;282 5;700 9;)00 15;000 
145 Bay State Road _3;144 7;100 10;4oo 17;500 
147 Bay State Road 7;024 17;600 22;4oo 4o;ooo 
19L~B:ay State Road 3;104 6;200 1_3,800 20;000 
Bay State Road 3;513 5;300 vacant rot 5;300 
Bay State ·Road 2;763 4;200 vacant lot 4;200 
Harrison Ave'. 50;000 75;000 vacant"· lot 75;000 
80 East Concord St. 33,000 .37,100 :"DO.:"g>7..~900 145,000 
0 Exempt under Clause 32, Benevolent Societies. Ibid~, p~ 136~ 
e dExempt under Clause 32, Benevolent Societies. Ibid., P• 290. 
Name and Address 
Area 
Square 
Feet 
~oston University (continued) 
78 East Concord St. 
96-100 Cummington Ave. 
700 Commonwealth Ave~ 
64o Commonwealth Ave. 
630~Qbmmonwealth Ave. 
225 Bay State Road 
675 Commonwealth Ave. 
226 Bay state Road 
787 Commonwealth Ave~ 
Rear Commonwealth Ave. 
Essex St. at Charles R. 
85J-859 Commonwealth Ave. 
6 Follen St. 
Carnegie Institute of' 
Medical Technology (formerly 
\'lilson School) 
Anderson & Pinckney St. 
Ohamberlayne School 
116 Commonwealth Ave. 
128 Corrnnonwealth Ave •. 
130 Commonwealth Ave. 
Emerson College 
126 ·Beaco:n, St. 
128 Beacon St. 
130 Beacon St. 
7;000 
8;634 
101;978 
45;919 
21;4o4 
6;267 
433;209 
4,381 
24;797 
36~384 
57;313 
77,082 
1,258 
5,887 
3;486 
3;;527 
3,327 
4;950 
4;050 
8,550 
Value 
of' 
Land 
7;900 
13;000 
50;900 
91;800 
41;700 
21;6oo 
1,300,000 
15;300 
12;000 
248;000 
73;000 
29,000 
231;200 
2,700 
27,900 
9;700 
8;100 
8,100 
17;300 
14;200 
42,700 
Value of' 
Building 
137;100 
112;000 
149;100 
158;200 
88;300 
16;4oo 
5,2oo;ooo 
59;700 
48;000 
83,000 
vacant lot 
vacant lot 
843;800 
9,300 
24,100 
15;300 
13;900 
13,900 
15;700 
15;800 
42,300 
Total 
Value 
145;000 
125;000 
200;000 
250;000 
130;000 
·4o1;ooo 
6,5oo;ooo 
75;000e 
6o;ooo 
331;000 
73;000 
29;000 
1,075,000 
·· 12; ooof' 
15,120,900 
52;000 
52,000 
25;000 
22;ooo 
22;000 
69,000 
3;5;000 
3o;ooo 
85,000 
eUpper line represents total value, obtained·f'rom ibid., :P• 127. 
Lower line is exempt value. Taxable value is $15,000. -.-
f'Exempt under Clause 33, Charitable Societies. Ibid., :P• 282. 
Name and Address 
Emerson College (continued) 
303 Berkeley St. 
143 Beacon St. 
145 Beacon St. 
373 Commonwealth Ave. 
Emmanuel College 
400 Fenway 
Louis Pasteur Ave. 
Brookline Ave. 
Brookline Ave •. 
Fisher Junior College 
112 Beacon St. 
114 Beacon st. 
116 Beacon St. 
118 Be§.con St. 
181 Beacon st .. 
86 Marlborough St. 
~orsyth ~ental School 
140 Fenway 
The Garland School of' 
Homemaking 
337 Commonwealth Ave. 
339 Commonwealth Ave. 
341 Commo11Weal th Ave~ 
343 Commonwealth Ave~ 
407 Commonwealth Ave~ 
409 Commonwealth Ave~ 
411 Commonwealth Ave~ 
413 Commonytealth Ave. 
Area 
Square 
Feet 
3;136 
2;191 
2s688 
5,684 
446;823 
51;101 
190,977 
16,15~ 
3,150 
3,009 
.3;150 
6,000 
2;353 
3,584 
2;988 
2;98.~ 
3;36t 
3i73§ 
3;523 
1~; 207 
4;415 ),8o2 
Value 
of' 
Land 
14;10~ 
3~300 
6;700 
28,400 
446;800 
51;000 
16o;ooo 
4o,4oo 
n;ooo 
10;500 
n;ooo 
21;000 
3;500 
7,200 
208,000 
7;500 
7;500 
8;4oo 
9;300 
15;900 
21;ooo 
22;100 
19,000 
Value of' 
Building 
7;900 
15;700 
13;300 
111,600 
403;200 
699;ooo 
200,000 
vacant lot 
9;000 
9;500 
9;ooo 
39)000 
10;500 
9,800 
500,000 
9;500 
9;500 
19;6oo 
9;700 
14;1oo 
54;ooo 
12;900 
13;ooo 
~xempt under Clause )2, Benevolent Societies. Ibid., p. 217. 
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Total 
Value 
22;ooo 
19;000 
2o;ooo 
14o;ooo 
349,000 
850;000 
750;000 
36o; ooo 
· 4o;4oo 
2,ooo,4oo 
2o;ooo 
2o;ooo 
20;000 
6o;ooo 
14;ooo 
l]jOOO 
151,000 
. .. --- r 
108;ocio 
708,000' 
17;000 
17;000 
19;ooo 
19;000 
3o;ooo 
75;ooo 
35;000 
32,000g 
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Area Value 
Square of' Value of' Total 
Name and Address Feet Land Building Value 
Garland School of' 
Homemaking (continued) 
415 Commonwealth Ave. 3,213 16,100 13,900 30;oooh 
274,000 
Harvard College 
107 Louis Pasteoo Ave. 76,752 76;800 1,088,200 1,165;000 
Blackf'an St. 46;797 3o;ooo vacant lot 30;000 
17-25 Blackf'an St. 47;157 42;500 . 112; 100 ·155;6oo 
25 Shattuck st. 490;825 490;800 2,355;200 2,846;ooo 
55 Shattuck St. 15',455 6,200 293,800 300,000 
Rear 55 Shattuck St. "855 800 vacant lot 800 
\ITigglesworth st. 1;6oo 3,200 vacant lot 3;200 
Wigglesworth St. "1;965 2;000 vacant lot 2;000 
Wigglesworth St. 2;016 2,000 vacant lot 2;ooo 
Wigglesworth St. 1;986 2.;200 vacant lot 2;200 
Wigglesworth St. 2;026 2;)00 vacant lot 2;300 
Wigglesworth St. 2;005 2,500 vacant lot 2;500 
Wigglesworth St. 1;6oo 2;200 vacant lot 2lf200 
"Vliggle sworth St. 1; 6oo 2;200 vae.ant lot 2;200 
Wigglesworth St. 1;6oo 2)200 vacant lot 2;200 
Huntington Ave. 1,520 3;4oo vacant lot :?;4oo 
Huntington Ave. 1;100 2;4oo vacant lot 2;4oo 
Huntington Ave. 1,219 2;700 vacant lot 2;(00 
19 ~1ay st. 3,026 1,200 8,)00 9;500 
(Bussey Institute) 
271-283~S.oirth st. 1o;ooo 1;ooo 28;500 29;500 
285--30TS.outh st. 615,384 55,000 178;800 23);800 
375-383 South St. 50,000. 4,000 176,000 180;000 
Centre St. 65;920 3,300 vacant lot 3;300 
1090 Centre St. :?48,655 :?4;900 2;500 37;4oo 
389 South St. 783,000 31,300 13,700 45,000 
(Part of Arnold 
Arboretum) 
Centre St. 622;680 14;ooo vacant lot 14;ooo 
Western Ave. 5;300 8o;ooo vacant lot 8o;ooo 
North Harvard S. E. 1;455;774 1;455;000 n;175;ooo 12;63o;ooo 
69-79 North Harvard 2,751;030 1,100;500 1,)73;800 2,474;300 
North Harvard St. 438,818 109,700 395,300 505,000 
~xempt under Clause 32, Benevolent Societies. Ibid., p. 217. 
Name and Address 
Harvard College (continued) 
254-256 Washington st. 
Mary Brooks School 
105 Marlborough st. 
107 Marlborough St. 
Massachusetts College 
of Optometry 
178 Newbury St. 
472 Commonwealth Ave. 
Massachusetts College of 
Pharmacy 
179 Longwood Ave. 
New England College 
of Pharmacy 
70-72 Mt. Vernon 
New England Conservatory 
of Music 
125 Hemenway 
282-286 Huntington Ave. 
294 Huntington Ave. 
Gainsborough & St. 
Botolph, Corner 
Area 
Square 
Feet 
2~781 
2,781 
8,4oo 
,3,125 
90,147 
12,50.3 
21;4,35 
5;999 
42,51.3 
4,679 
Value 
of 
Land 
67,.300 
7;000 
7,000 
117,200 
50,000 
5.3;6oo 
18;000 
1~0,200 
14,000 
Value of 
Building 
57,700 
n;ooo 
,38,000 
122;800 
12,500 
587,800 
125,000 
lo6;4oo 
982;000 
629,800 
486,ooo 
i Exempt under Clause 20, Special Clause. Ibid., p. 562. 
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Total 
Value 
·125;oooi 
20,89,3,500 
18;ooo 
45;000 
6,3,000 
190;000 
25i000 
215,000 
705;000 
705,000 
175~000 
175,000 
·16o;ooo 
1,ooo;ooo 
800,000 
-~o;ooo 
2, .60, 000 
100 
Area Value 
Sfluare of' Value of' Total 
Name and Address Feet Land Building Value 
Northeastern University 
149 St. Stephen 1 s 
corner Forsyth _ 
North East Side 56,817 85,)00 1,700 87,000 
Forsyth East corner 
Hemenway South East 
Side )8,7?7 58;000 vacant lot 58;000 
81-8? st. Stephens 6,000 12,000 16,000 28,000 
Nor~west side st. 
Stephens ?5,961 14,500 vacant lot 14,500 
Northwest side St. 
Stephens ;58,8ll 17,700 vacant lot 17,700 
Huntington Ave. f'rom 
170 St. Stephen St. ?3;764 101;)00 vacant lot 101,300 
Huntington Ave. 7;647 15;000 vacant lot 15;000 
15 Drisco St. 95;658 191;)00 45,000 236;)00 
63-69 Field St. ~,495 ),000 vacant lot 3,000 
Bills ct. North Corner 
Ruggles St. 3;360 1;200 vacant lot 1~200 
Tavern Rd. 2,265 1;200 vacant lot 1;200 
Tavern Rd. 2~274 1;100 vacant lot 1;100 
24 Field St. 6;877 2;4oo vacant lot 2;4oo 
70 Forsyth 30,000 6o,ooo 175,000 235,000 
Northeast Y.M.C.A. lot 
unnamed southeast 1;795 2;700 vacant lot 2;700 
Unnamed at rear of' north 48;050. 5o;ooo 1~450~000 1;5oo;ooo 
Huntington Ave. 10?$,766 266,900 1,000,000 1,266,900 
Y.M.C.A. )60 Huntington 
St. East Corner 244;756 6o5;6oo ),238;4oo 3,844;ooo 
402 Marlborough St. 2;688 ?;4oo 7;6oo n;ooo 
428 Marlborough st. 1,755 ),500 6,500 10%000 
7,436,)00 
Portia Law School 
45 Mt. Vernon St. 2;790 16;700 2);)00 4o;ooo 
47 Mt. Vernon St. 2,91) 14,6oo 37,400 222000 
92,000 
Simmons College 
e )00 Fenway 166;541 209;800 1,010, 200 1,22o;ooo Worthington Ave. 1)6,761 1)6,800 vacant lot 1)6,800 
)21 Brookline Ave. 
North corner 88,950 89,000 6oo,ooo 689,000 
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Area Value 
Square of Value of Total 
Name and Address Feet Land Building Value 
Simmons College (continued) 
62 Pilgrim Road 15;000 10; 500 289;500 ;>oo;ooo 
54 :Pilgrim Road 15;000 10;500 ;:>;500 14;ooo 
46 Pilgrim Road 14,610 10,200 ),800 14,000 
4 :Pilgrim Road 
Southeast junction ~9; 795 20;000 ;>oo;ooo ;52o;ooo 
Pilgrim Road 1);950 17;000 150;000 167;000 
7 Pilgrim Road 15;000 18;ooo 15o;ooo 168;ooo 
281 Pilgrim Road 15;000 18;ooo ;>;ooo 21;ooo 
)05 Brookline Ave. 16;056 2o;ooo n4;ooo 1;>4;ooo 
49 Commonwealth Ave. );237 11;)00 38;700 50;000 
51 Oonrmom1ealth Ave. 6,474 22,700 27,)00 202000 
),)04,800 
Suffolk University 
61 Temp 1e St. corner 
• 
20 Devonshire st. 9;493 71;ooo 222;500 293;500 
51 Temple St. 4,015 1),200 88,800 1022000 
)95,500 
Tufts College 
Northwest Tyler st. 
Corner of Oak St. 26;591 40'000 540,700 580)700 
' 194 Harrison Ave. lj508 ;;;;ooo vacant lot ;>;ooo 
192 Harrison Ave. 1;508 ;;;;ooo vacant lot );000 
190 Harrison Ave. 1;475 );000 vacant lot 3;ooo 
188 Harrison Ave. 1;475 ;>;ooo vacant lot );000 
186 Harrison Ave. 1;)00 2;6oo vacant lot 2;6oo 
184 Harrison Ave. 1;511 3;ooo vacant lot ;>;ooo 
182 Harrison Ave. 1;:400 2;eoo vacant lot 2;&oo 
180 Harrison Ave. 1;530 ;;;;ooo vacant lot 3;ooo 
178 Harrison Ave. 1;650 );300 vacant lot 3~300 
Form 176 Harrison Ave~ 1;650 3;300 vacant lot 3;300 
Form 148 Harrison Ave. 8,258 33;000 vacant lot 53;ooo 
Form 51 Harvard ·8oo 1;200 Vf!cant lot 1;200 
Tyler l;o4o 1;6oo vacant lot 1;6oo 
Tyler 1;300 2;000 vacant lot 2;000 
Tyler 2;556 3;900 vacant lot 3;900 
Tyler 1;:278 < 1;900 vacant lot 1;900 
•• 
140-144 Harrison Ave. 14,661 58,6oo 431,400 ·490i000 
1,144,900 
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Area Value 
Square of' Value of' Total 
Name and Address Feet Land Building Value 
----
Wentworth Institute 
30....48 Evans Way 30;199 6o;4oo 229~600 290;000 
590 Huntington Ave: 13,012 19,500 25,500 45,5)00 
584 Huntington Ave. 
West corner Vancouver St. 2,312 7,000 vacant lot 7,000. 
South side Huntington 
1,3oo;ooo~ Ave. 445;247 445;ooo 855,000 
Hu11.tington Ave. 139,151 312,j;)OO vacant lot · 212;oooJ 
1,612,000 
Wheelock College 
1~4 R~4erway 10 84o 21,~00 24,100 ~~,oook 1 0-1 Riverway 15~150 30; 00 3 ' 00 ,ooo 
Riverway 4:,999 6;300 vacant lot 6~300 
132 Riverway 6,978 14,ooo 56,000 70,000 
South Massachusetts 
Ave. corner 15,934 16,000 4o,ooo 56;ooo 
31 Pilgrim Road 27,286 27;300 60;700 88;ooo 
39 Pilgrim Road 9,450 11;8oo 73,200 85~000 
47-49 Pilgrim Road 6,729 8,4oo 11, 6oo 20,000 
Massachusetts Ave. 
corner tennis courts 28,824 36,000 vacant lot 26iOOO 
471,300 
jExempt under Clause 34, Scientif'ic Institutions. Ibid., p. 340. 
~-
kExempt under Clause 32, Benevolent S~cieties. Ibid., p. 461. 
APPENDIX C CALCULATION OF FULL TIME EQUIVALENT STUDENTS AND 
TUITION DATA IN EXEMPT HIGHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 
1. Bentley School of AccoUl~ting and Finance 
921 Boylston Street (now Bentley College) 
Bentley had 844 full time students as of January, 1960. These 
full time students paid $650 per year tuition. Evening students numbered 
2,297 and paid $160 per year. To obtain the number of hours worked by 
evening students, proportionality of tuition was assumed. $160 is al-
most one quarter of $650, so that evening students were assumed to work 
one quarter of a conventional )0 hour semester, or 7! hours. There 
was no summer school. Thus: 
844 + 22950 x.l~= 1418 f'ull time equivalent students 
Tuition was $650 per year. All data i·rere derived from telephone calls 
during July, 1960. 
2. Boston College 
126 Newbury Street 
Boston College has evidently transferred all of its f'acilities ex-
cept f'or the School of Social Work to its Chestnut Hill campus. The 
School of Social Work had 151 full time students (fall, 1958). All 
part time and summer students use facilities at the main campus. Total 
enrollment 7,416. Tuition $800 per year. Enrollment and tuition data 
were derived fromMary Irwin (ed.), American Colleges and Universities 
(8th ed., Washington: American Council on Education, 1960), pp. 49?-494 
(hereafter cited as American Colleges and Universities). All other in-
formation from phone call, July, 1960. 
e· 
3. The Boston Conservatory of Music 
28 The Fenway 
lo4 
The~Boston Conservatory of Music had 160 full time students (June, 
1958) and 100 summer students (July, 1960). /Evening students are 
.; 
charged largely on an individual basis and data are not available. The 
cost of summer school is $275--$300 or ~44 per credit hour. The approxi-
mate average summer fee was divided by the cost per hour (which was 
nearly proportional to the full time tuition of $750)and the average num-
ber of hours was obtained. A 30 semester hour program is again assumed. 
Thus: 
160 .j.; 28~250 X 100 
30 
203 full time equivalent students. 
Tuition was $750 per year. Full time enrollment and tuition data were 
derived from Christian E. Burckel (ed.), The College Blue Book (9th ed., 
Chicago: by the editor, 1959), pp. 64-65 (hereafter referred to as 
College ~ Book). Part time data from phone calls, July, 1960. 
4. The Boston School of Occupational Therapy 
7 Harcourt Street 
The Boston School of Occupational Therapy had 29 full time students. 
There were no summer and evening students. Tuition was $850 per year. 
All enrollment information obtained from phone calls, July, 1960. Tui~ 
tion information obtained from College Blue Book, ppl 64-65. 
5· Boston University 
755 Commonwealth Avenue 
Boston University had 13,664 full time students (fall, 1958) and an 
average of 4500 ( 11 between four and five thousand~) summer students work-
105 
ing an approximate average of 5 semester hours per summer, and 3700 
evening students working 3.3 hours per semester ( 6.6 hours :,-per year). 
The extension division students are probably duplicated in summer and 
evening enrollments and in the enrollments of other cooperating insti-
tutions in adult extension education. Full time equivalent students 
13,664 ... 3700 X 6.6 . 4500 X 5 . 15 228 30 :'" 30 = ' 
Average tuition (weighted by enrollments) was $937.34 per year. Full 
time and evening e11rollments and L'tuition data are from American Colleges 
13..nd Universitie.s_, pp. 494-497 (fall, 1958), and the summer enrollment 
" 
and numbers of hours worked by part time and summer students were from 
telephone calls (July, 1960). 
6. Carnegie Institute (formerly the Wilson 
School) of Medical Technology 
65 Anderson Street 
The Carnegie Institute had 100 full time students and 25 evening 
students. The course for day students costs $1295 and is completed in 
one year. The course for night students costs half as much and requires 
two years to complete. This proportionality leads to the calculation 
that there were 
100 t. 12 = 112 full time equivalent students. 
All data from phone calls (July, 1960). 
7. Chamberlayne Jr. College 
128 Commonwealth Avenue 
Chamberlayne Jr. College had 169 full time students (fall, 1958) 
106 
and 88 part time students (July, 1960) -v1ho -vrorked 6 hours per year. 
Thus: 
169 + 88ox 6_~ 187 full time equivalent students. 
50 "' 
Tuition was $675 per year. Full time student and tuition data were 
obtained from American Junior College~ (Washington: American Council 
on Education, 1960), p~ .241 (hereafter cited as American Junior College~>). 
Part time data from telephone calls. 
8. Emerson College 
150 Beacon Street 
Emerson had 447 full time students (fall, 1958). There were 110 
summer students working ~ hours on the average and 152 evening students 
working 7! hours on the average. Tuition was $900 per year. Full time 
student figure from American Colleges and Universities, p. 502. Part 
time students from telephone calls. 
9. Emmanuel College 
4oo The Fenway 
Emmanuel College had 756 full time students (fall, 1958). All part 
time and summer students were members of a religious order and no attem~t 
was made to determine their full time equivalence. Tuition was $700.per 
year. All data from American Colleges and Universit::ies, pp. 502J 505, 
and a telephone call. 
10. Fisher Junior College 
118 Beacon Street 
Fisher Junior College had 550 full time students and no evening or 
summer students (fall, 1958). Tuition was $800 per year. All data from 
• American Junior Colleges, pp. 24), 244. 
11. The Forsythe School ~or Dental Hygienists 
140 The Fenway 
107 
The Forsythe School ~or Dental Hygienists has 145 ~ull time stu-
dents, no summer, and no evening students. Tiiliti.e~n was $700 per year. 
All data ~rom Colle~ ~Book (June, 1958) and telephone calls (July, 
12. The Garland School 
409 Commonwealth Avenue 
The Garland School had 196 full time students (fall, 1958), no 
summer, and no evening students. Tuition was $75C per year. All data 
from American Junior Colleges, pp. 244-245. 
1). Harvard branches: 
Dental Medicine 1!44 Longwood Avenue 
Public Health 56 Shattuck Street 
Medical School 25 Shattuck Street 
Graduate School of Business Administration 
16 North Harvard Street 
These schools had a combined total of 2,178 full time students. All 
part time and summer students use ~acilities in Cambridge. Total enroll-
ment data not recorded since expenditure data are not available for cal-
culation o~ per student expenditures. Average tuition (weighted by en-
rollments in respective schools) was $1,416.8). Data on tuition and en-
rollments ~rom American Colleges and Universities, PP• 505-506. Status 
of part time students from telephone call. 
14. The Mary Brooks School 
107 Marlborough Street 
• 
-
108 
The Mary Brooks School has a~ average of 82 full time students 
(between 80 and 85); no evening or summer students. Tuition was $650 
per year. All data from telephone calls (July, 1960). 
15. The Massachusetts College of Optometry 
178 Newbury Street 
The Massachusetts College of Optometry had 105 full time students_ 
(June, 1958); 22 of their own graduates were working i~ the summer for 
$2)0 per course while 4) students from other schools paid $250. More 
or less proportional tuition is assumed with an average of $24) being 
spent by a summer student. This was 57.4% of a full year 1 s work ii' 
the tuitions were proportio~al. Tb.is leads to a number of summer hours 
of 11. This number of hours was mqltiplied by the number of summer stu-
dents and diV.ided by the )0 hours of typical college year. Thus~ 
105 + 65 x 11 ~ 129 full time equivalent students. 
)0 -
Full time tuition was $650 per year. Full time students a~d tuition 
taken from College Blue Book, pp. 66, 67. Summer students from a tele-
phone call (July, 1960). There was no evening school. 
16. Massachusetts College of Pharmacy 
179 Longwood Avenue 
The Massachusetts College of Pharmacy had 487 full time students 
(June, 1958) and no summer or evening programs. Tuition was $500 per 
year. Full time students and tuition from College ~ Book, pp. 66, 
67. Part time information from telephone call, July, 1960~ 
17. The New England College of Pharmacy 
70 Mt. Vernon Street 
• 
-
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The New England College of Pharmacy had 22.0 fu:lLtime students 
(June, 1958)i no summer and no evening program. Tuition was $584 per 
year. Full time students and tuition from College Blue Book, pp. 68, 
69. Part time information from telephone calls, July, 1960. 
18. The New England Conservatory of' Music 
290 Huntington Avenue 
The New England Conservatory had 365 full time students (fall, 
1958) and 49 summer students (July, 1960) who worked an average of 6 
hours apiece. No estimate could be made of evening students because 
statistical data is kept on the basis of degree and non degree students 
only. Also most evening students are charged on an individual basis. 
Thus: 
Tuition was $1250 per year. Full time students and tuition from 
American Colleges and Universities, p. 512. Summer and evening students 
from telephone calls. 
19. Northeastern University 
)60 Huntington Avenue 
Northeastern University had 15,964 full time students, 1,716 
summer students who were assumed to work 5 hours, and 795 evening and 
extension students who were assumed to work 3 hours per semester (9 per 
year), giving a calculated full time equivalent of 16,409 students. 
These assumptions had to be made because no information could be or 
would be made available in telephone conversations with Northeastern--
references to Northeastern did not include hours of work of' part time 
• 
-
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students. It was felt that there was sufficient similarity to Boston 
University in many respects to permit imputing similar characteristics 
to Northeastern. If the estimates should be grossly wrong (but they do 
~eem quite reasonable) it "Should be noted that there was no intention 
to introduce bias in any way. Thus: 
Average tuition (weighted by full time enrollments) was $665 per year. 
Full time students (fall, 1958t> from American Colleges and Universitie.§, 
"":~-~ 
pp. 512, 51). Summer and evening students, College Blue Book, pp. 68, 
20. The Portia Law School 
47 Mt. Vernon Street 
The Portia Law School had 175 full time students (June, 1958). Ef-
forts to obtain information respecting the existence of a summer or even-
ing program, enrollments and number of hours, through telephone calls and 
a letter to the dean produced no results. Portia Law School, however, 
was so small relative to the other schools that if the hypothesis is 
correct that full time equivalent students or just full time students 
could be used indifferently well to determine the average subsidy, then 
a truly negligible difference exists here. Tuition was $510 per year 
()0 hours at $17 per hour). Full time students from Colle',Se Blue Book, 
pp. 68, 69. No data from telephone calls. 
21. Simmons College 
1)00 The Fenway 
Simmons Colle~ had 1,472 full time students (fall, 1958), and 249 
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summer students (July, 1960) who worked 7 ho~rs a year, while 110 even-
ing students worked zi hours a semester (July, 1960) (5 hours per year). 
This;.tyielded a number of full time equivalent students. Thus: 
249 X J ~ 110 X 5 + 1472 : 1548 
)0 )0 
Tuition was $90~ per year. Full time students and tuition from Ameri-
can Colleges and Universities, pp. 516, 517. Summer and evening students 
per telephone calls (July, 1960). 
2~. Suffelk University 
20 Derne Street 
Sufi'olk University had 1,:?94 i'ull time students (fall, 19.58) and :?50 
summer students (July, 1960) working 2 hours per summer; 501 evening 
students (July, 1960) worked 9 ho~rs per year. Thus: 
1)94 + 350 X 2 + 501 X 9 : 1567 
)0 50 
Tuition was $700 per year. Full time students and tuition from American 
Colleges and Universities, p. 524. Part time and summer data from tele-
phone calls (July, 1960). 
25. The Tufts Scheel of Medicine 
156 Harrison Avenue 
The Tufts School of Dental Medicine 
156 Harrison Avenue 
These two schools had 852 full time students (June, 1958). Tuition 
was $1000 per year. There are no summer or evening programs in these 
schools. The total university enrollment was 4,161 (for per student ex-
penditure calculations). Total university enrollment and tuition data 
were derived fromAmerican Colleges and Universities; PP• 524, 525. En-
rollment data for the medical and dental schools were derived from 
College Blue Book, pp. 70-71. 
24. Wentworth Institute 
550 Huntington Avenue 
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Wentworth Institute had 1)89 full time students (fall, 1958) and 
139 part time evening and extension students working on assumed 5 hours 
per year. The number of evening, summer, and adult extension students 
couldn•t be obtained separately from the school, so the entire part time 
enrollment was assumed to work 2i hours per semester. This one ho~, on 
a semester basis, than the unknown number of summer students works and 
one less hour than the typical evening student assumption i'or other 
schools. Typically summer students work less than 5 hours per summer 
and evening students more than 5 hours per year. 5 hours as an average 
assumption would seem to be reasonable unless there were relatively 
far more summer students than evening students or vice versa. Thus' 
1389 ~· 129 X 5 : 1581 
30 
Tuition was $6oO per year. Full time students and tuition from American 
Junior Colleges, p. 250. No information was obtained from the numerous 
telephone calls. 
25. Wheelock College 
1)2 Riverway 
Wheelock had 377 full time students (fall, 1958) and 72 summer stu-
dent• (July, 1960) who worked 6 hours a summer. No significant number 
of evening students were enrolled (July, 1960). Evening classes were 
mostly confined to late ai'ternooh courses for regular students. Total 
:f'~lJ: :~im..e equivalo_:nt st~d~n.ts&; 
fg.l:l tim..e student~ :f'r--em.. A:tner-.fc~:t=l:t.::s -
a.nd Wniversities, pp,. 52~,. 5?~'~: SIJUll!ll.er a::f.l,d -even;ing stu;d:et.l~e;~~ iJ~;J,_~"' 
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.(I.PPENDIX D RANK ORDERS 
Rarik Order--Subsidies ££ Per Student Expenditures 
Two Year Schools 
Subsidies--Natural Order 
1. Bentley 
2. Ohamberlayne 
3. Fisher 
4. Carnegie 
5· Mary Brooks 
6. Wentworth 
7. Garland 
Expenditures 
422.57 
1888.89 
89_3.09 
718~61 
185-38 
1093~28 
1883.25 
Rank Order--Subsidies ~ Tuition 
Two Year Schools 
----
Subsidies--Natural Order 
1. Bentley 
2. Ohamberlayne 
3· Fisher 
4. Oarn~gie 
5· Mary Brooks 
6. Boston School of Occ. Therapy 
7. Wentworth 
8. Garland 
9. Forsythe 
Tuition 
650 
675 
800 
1295 
650 
850 
6oo 
750 
700 
Ra.rik Order--Subsidies ~ Per Student Expenditures 
Four Year Schools in Boston Only 
Subsidies-Natural Order Expenditures 
1. Suf'folk 458-38 
2. Northeastern 415.84 
3· Portia. 772.71 
4. Emerson 1064.09 
5· N.E. College of Pharmacy 86).16 
6. Boston University 1299.10 
7. Wheelock 1330.23 
8. Mass. College of Pharmacy 628.94 
9. Mass. College of Optometry 610.27 
10. Simmons 1535.26 
11. Ennnanuel 1046.37 
12. N.E. Conservatory of Music 1775.16 
Rank 
2 
7 
4 
3 
1 
5 
6 
Raiik 
2t 
4 
7 
9 
2t 
8 
1 
6 
5 
Rank 
2 
1 
5 
8 
6 
9 
10 
4 
3 
11 
7 
12 
e 
Rank Order--subsidies on Tuition 
Four Year Schools in Boston Only 
Subsidies--Natural Order Tuition 
1. Suf':folk 700 
2. Northeastern 665 
). Portia 510 
-4. Emerson 900 
5· N.E. College o:f Pharmacy 584 
6. Boston University 9;51 
1· Boston Conservatory 750 
8. Wheelock 900 
9 .. Mass. College o:f Pharmacy 500 
10. Mass. College of Optometry 650 
11. Simmons 900 
12. Emmanuel 700 
ll' N.E. Conservatory o:f Music 1250 .t)
Rank Order--Subsidies oh Per Student Expenditures 
~ ~ Schools Including Those with Only Branches in Boston 
Subsidies~Natural Order Expenditures 
1. Su:ffolk 458.;58 
2. Northeastern . 41~.84 
). Portia 772-71 
4. Emerson 1064.09 
5· N.E. College of Pharmacy 86;5.16 
6. Boston University 1299.10 
1· Wheelock 1;5)0.2;5 
8. Tuf'ts 2221.41 
9. Mass. College of Pharmacy 628.94 
10. Mass. College of Optometry 610.27 
lq.. Simmons 15;55.26 
1~. Emmanuel 1046.;57 
1;5. N.E. Conservatory o:f Music 1775-16 
14. Boston College 995-;52 
Rank Order--Subsidies ££ Tuitfuon 
Foijr Year Schools Including Those with Only Branches in Boston 
Subsidies--Natural Order Tuition 
1. Suf:folk 700 
2. Northeastern 665 
5· Portia 510 
4. Emerson 900 
5· N.E. College o:f Pharmacy 584 
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6% 2 
5 
2 
10 
' 12 8 
10 
1 
4 
10 
a 2 
1;5 
Rank 
2 
1 
5 
9 
6 
1® 
11 
14 
4 
' 12 8 
15 
7 
Rank 
~ 
5 
2 
11 
5 
Subsidies--Natural Order Tuition 
6. Boston University 937 
7- Bost~n-Conservatory 750 
8. Wheelock 900 
9. Tufts 1000 
10. Mass. College of' Pharmacy 500 
11. Mass. College of' Optometry 650 
12. Simmons 900 
13. Emmanuel 700 
14. N.E. Conservatory of' Music 1250 
15. Harvard 1416 
16. Boston College 800 
Rank Order--Subsidies ~ Per Student Expenditures 
All Schools in Boston Only 
Subsidies--Natural Order 
1. Suffolk 
2. Bentley 
). Ohamberlayne 
4. Northeaste-rn 
5. Fisher 
6. Carnj!!;gie 
7. Portia 
8. Emerson 
9. Mary Brooks 
10. N.E. College of' Pharmacy 
11. Boston University 
12. Wheelock 
13. Wentworth 
14. Garland 
15. Mass. College of' Bharmacy 
16. Mass. College of' Optometry 
17. Simmons 
18. EI!llll8.nue 1 
121 N.E. Conservatory of' Music 
Expenditures 
458.)8 
422.57 
1888.'89 
415.84 
89).09 
718.61 
772.71 
1064.09 
185.38 
86).16 
1299.10 
1330.23 
1093-28 
188).25 
628.94 
610.27 
1535-26 
1046.37 
17.75.16 
- Rank Order-Subsidies on Tuition 
All Schools in Boston Only 
Subsidies--Natural Order 
1. Suffolk 
2. Bentley 
). Ohamberlayne 
4. Northeastern 
5· Fisher 
Tuition 
700 
650 
675 
665 
800 
116 
Rank 
13 
8 
11 
14 
1 
4 
11 
6i 
15 
16 
9 
4 
3 
19 
2 
10 
7 
8 
12 
1 
9 
14 
15 
13 
18 
6 
5 
16 
11 
17 
Rank 
11 
6 
9 
8 
15 
• 
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Subsidies--Natural Order Tuition Rank 
6. Carnegie 1295 22 
7. Portia 510 2 
8. Emerson 900 18 
9· Me.ry Brooks 650 6 
10. N.E. College of Pharmacy 584$' 3 
11. Boston School of Occ. Therapy 850 16 
12. Boston University 937 20 
13. Bo storr: Conservatory 750 l)t 
14. Wheelock 900 18 
15. Wentworth 6oo 4 
l-6. Garland 750 13t 
17. Mass. College of Pharmacy 500 1 
18. Mass. College of Optometry 650 6 
19. Simmons 900 18 
20. Enn:nanuel 700 11 
21. Forsythe 700 11 
22. N.E. Conservatory of Music 1250 21 
Rank Order--Subsidies ~ Per Student Expenditures 
All Schools Including Those with Only Branches in Boston ;. 
Subsidies--Natural Order EMpenditures Rank 
1. Suffolk 458.38 4 
2. Bentley 422.57 3 
3· Chamber layne 1888 .. 89 20 
4. Northeastern 415.84 2 
5· Fisher 893.09 10 
6. Carnegie 718.61 7 
7. Portia 772.71 f!i 
8. ~mer son 1064.09 13 
9· Mary Brooks 185.38 l 
10. N.E. College of Pharmacy 863.16 9 
11. Boston University 1299.10 15 
12. Wheelock 1330.23 16 
1;5. Wentworth 1093.28 14 
14. Tufts 2221.41 21 
15. Garland 1883.25 19 
16. Mass. College of Pharmacy 628.94 6 
17. Mass. College of Optometry 610.27 5 
18. Simmons 15)5.26 17 
19. Emmanuel 1046.37 12 
20. N.E. Conservatory of Music 1775.16 18 
21. Boston College 993-32 11 
• 
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Rank Order--Subsidies on Tuition 
All Schools Including Those with Only Branches in Boston 
Subsidies~-Natural Order Tuition Rank 
---
1. Suffolk 700 11 
2. Bentley 650 6 
3· Chamber layne 675 9 4. Northeastern 665 8 
5· Fisher 800 15! 
6. Carnegie 1295 24 
1· Portia 510 2 
8. Emerson 900 19 
9· Mary Brooks 650 6 
10. N.E. College of Pharmacy 584 3 
11. Boston School of Occ. Therapy 850 17 
12. Boston University 937 21 
13. Boston Conservatory 750 13t 
14. Wheelock- 900 19 
15. Wentworth 6oo 4 
16. Tufts 1000 22 
17. Garland 750 l:?t 
18. Mass. College of' Pharmacy 500 1 
19. Mass. College of Optometry 650 6 
20 .. Simmons 900 19 
21. Emmanuel 700 11 
22. Forsythe 700 11 
23. N.E. Conservatory of Music 1250 23 
24. Harvard 1416 25 
25. Boston College 800 15! 
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ABSTRACT 
Little empirical in~ormation has ever been collected concerning 
the exemption o~ the real property o~ higher educational institutions 
~rom local property taxes and the consequent subsidies to students that 
result ~rom this public policy. This paper undertakes to examine the 
data on Boston, Massachusetts, as part o~ the general problem o~ property 
tax exemption subsidies ~or higher education. 
In a per~ectly competitive, £ull employment, free market economy, 
higher education must be subsidized i~ economic wel~are is to be maximized. 
Education results in gains not only to the individual, but society as 
well. The gains to society ~rom an intellectual and sophisticated citi-
zenry require that society reduce the individualt s cost o~ education in 
relation to the contribution he makes to society by virtue o~ being edu-
cated. In this way, society is able to gain v.;ithout there being uncom-
pensated cost to the individual. 
Local governments have long recognized the social gains ~rom educa-
tion and have exempted educational property ~rom local property taxation. 
This, o~ course, means that, with a given annual revenue requirement, 
the taxes on taxable property must be higher than they would be i~ there 
were no exemptions. 
The problem of determining whether or not the exemption 0~ educa-
tional property is an e~ficri.ent subsidy is complicated by the ~act that 
resource allocation in other economic activities is probably not per~ect. 
Furthermore, criteria o~ e~~iciency may con~lict with social value judg-
~ 1~ 
ments concerning the distribution of' income. Society may choose through 
its taxes or subsidies to make the rich worse of'f' in order to help the 
poor or it may decide not to subsidize education as much as ef'f'iciency 
criteria would warrant because this might benef'it more rich people than 
poor. At best, the criteria of' eff'iciency and equity are standards by 
which the real world can be judged. 
In order to judge tax exemption subsidies, however, information 
must be available. From a public interest point of' view, the most ob-
vious criticism and maybe the most important is the f'act that so little 
seems to be known about the quantitative aspects of' tax exemption subsi-
dies. Implicit in the exemption of property f'rom taxation are the assump-
tions that the people in local communities who are paying taxes are going 
to benef'it from the education being produced in their community; that 
property is an important f'actor of production in education; and that the 
combination of buildings of' those that are exempt is always the proper 
mix of laboratories and classrooms on the one hand and stadiums and so-
cial f'acilities on the other. While the general public may not be able 
to support these assumptions, it would be improper to argue that the pub-
lic is indifferent or apathetic to taxation and subsidization. This pub-
lic policy can be inf'erred to be at least minimally satisf'actory by its 
long history of' acceptance. 
The same argument can be applied to the ef'fect this public policy 
has on the distribution of income. Property taxes are regressive. They 
take a greater proportion of' income from the poor than they do from the 
rich. More rich go to college than do the poor. Thus the tax to subsi-,. 
dize those who are mostly rich in college is derived in a greater propor-
tion from those that are poor. However, other public policies, either 
by local governm~nts or by higher levels of government, may be deemed 
adequate by society to redress the potential unbalancing of the income 
distribution. 
Boston was regarded as an excellent city in which to study the prob-
lems of property tax e~emptions. Boston has serious fiscal problems; it 
is host to what is felt to be a larger than average proportion of higher 
educational institutions; and a quantity of assessment data was near at 
hand. 
Boston•s total property assessed valuation amounted to $2,230,000,000 
in 1959. Approximately one third of this total is exempt f'romtt.axation,. 
However, only $87,000,300 is exempt for literary and educational purposes, 
and of this amount $60,819,000 is exempt for college level educational 
in.sti tutions. 
The valuation data for college level schools were individually summed 
and each was multiplied by the 1960 tax rate. Each of' these products 
was divided by a full time equivalent number of students, which was com.-
puted from educational directory data and from information supplied by 
the schools. The quotients obtained from these computations represent 
the per student subsidy per year in Boston 1 s schools. The subsidies 
range from $25.42 to $660.59 for those schools which are almost entirely 
within. the city1 s boundaries, while the upper limit is $1,373.79 when 
schools like Harvard and Boston College are included in the analysis. 
The average subsidy in the former case 1s $14).)8 and when the 
schools which are principally out of to~m are included it is $22).98. 
The standard deviations are 158.05 and )24.45 respectiv-ely. There 
should be a direct relationship between the subsidies and indices of 
educational quality to explain the variation surrounding these averages. 
Alternatively, one might reasonably expect the subsidies to have a 
direct relation to an index of students• incomes. 
Rank correlation tests were performed relating the subsidies to 
the school expenditures per student as an index of quality and to tui-
tions as an index of student income. While all rank correlation coeffi-
cients were positive, they were all very low and were, with but one ex-
ception, statistically nonsigni:f'icant. There was less than a five per 
cent chance that the rank correlation coefficients were not zero. 
There are many possible reasons for this. Per student expendi-
tures and tuition may be poor indices of quality and inco~ respectively. 
However, there also a number of errors such as those which arise when 
intertemporal data on schools' enrollments or tuitions are combined~ 
which diminish the accuracy of rankings, eapecially when members of a 
ranking are close together. 
Greater error, however, stems from the fact:: that dormitories and 
other buildings not devoted to educational production cannot be separate-
ly identified. The subsidy for education reported for the school with 
dormitories is going to be overstated, while it will be appropriate for 
the school without these facilities. 
More important than any o~ these considerations is the state o~ 
assessed valuations in Boston. Full and ~air market value is the assess-
ment criterion in Massachusetts communities. However, as a usual proce-
dure, most property, in most communities, is valued at a ~raction o~ this 
amount. In Boston, new property built ~or educational production is 
valued at its ~ull value, while properties acquired by schools subsequent 
to their construction are o~ten valued at the ~raction o~ ~ull value 
normally associated with taxable properties. The values on new and old 
buildings are not comparable. 
The problem o~ making valuations comparable would not be too ~or­
midable ~ the values on taxable properties were consistent with one 
another and to assessment criteria~ In Boston, however, nothing could 
be further ~rom the case. Some valuations have not been changed since 
the early thirties, while others have increased or decreased with apparent 
randomness. 
If the property tax exemption were ever to be removed ~rom higher 
educational institution property in Boston, either by constitutional 
amendment or by a quasi property tax such as a sewage usage tax, it is 
to be hoped that a complete revalua~ion would be per~ormed on all prop-
erties. There are e~~orts being ma·de to obtain property reassessments 
at this time. Actually, however, the estimate o~ $6oO,OOO (on 
$60,819,300 worth o~ property) of revenue being ~oregone is quite rea-
sonable, even a~ter considering the e~~ects o~ i~lation during the 
~orties and the fact that new and old buildings are assessed on d~~er­
ent bases. 
12~ 
Boston has declined in recent years, particularly in respect to 
population. There is a temptation to impute this decline to improper 
taxation. However, there are too many other variables, such as a taste 
for suburban living to permit one to do so. 
However, Bostonts proble:mp, it should be remembered, are but a 
part of the larger general problem. Since property tax exemption sub-
sidies in this eEample have grown with little recognition for a rela-
tionship between the subsidies and educational quality, an alternative 
public policy which would require comprehensive assessments as a require-
ment for implementation would seem to be desirable. This would enable 
policy makers to determine the appropriateness and impo~tance of prop-
erty as a factor of production through which to implement a subsidy. 
There are many alternatives to tax exemption subsidies. They in-
clude building into the sky in urban areas, building into low value areas, 
and the paying of in lieu of tax payments to the cities. 
However, the alternative which would bring about reassessments, and 
which could alleviate the pressure on local governments of expanding 
educational facilities, would be for the federal government to provide 
in lieu payments to cities to make up for the revenue foregone from ex-
empting educational institutions from property taxation. 
Reasonably uniform assessments could be derived from fire insurance 
data or from rents properties earn in alternative uses. These could be 
applied to educational properties nationally and the importance of prop-
erty as a factor of production and its appropriateness as a vehicle for 
subsidization could be determined. 
An estimate of the cost of this policy to be paid from revenues de-
rived from the federal income tax is around $60,000,000 for one hundred 
cities which have as many exempt colleges and universities as does Bos-
ton; plus another $1,000,000 for administration. Since there will not 
be many cities with so high a dollar value of exempt property as Boston, 
these are very generous assumptions; although there will be many smaller 
communities with one or more exempt educational institutions. 
The advantages of such a proposal are numerous. The nation as a 
whole benefits from educational output and there will be little fear of 
labor mobility causing a city to lose the benefits of educational subsi-
dies. Furthermore, the federal income tax is progressive and can be ad-
justed to be more or less progressive according to social demands. Fed-
eral government revenqes are also more responsive to social demands. The_ 
federal budget need not be so consistently in balance to maintain govern-
ment credit. State and local governments must keep their budgets in ba-
lance to a much greater extent. 
Income tax revenue would have to increase by an amount nearly equal 
to the decrease in property taxes. Theoretically this would be the case. 
Of course, there will be objections to greater federal government parti-
cipation in economic affairs. There is always a fear of control. How-
ever, it would see:m difficult to exert control over individuals by a pay-
ment for buildings. 
Such a policy has precedence. Where federal installations impose 
burdens on local primary and secondary educational facilities, in lieu 
payments are made to the cities. In lieu payments for college proper-
ties represent a modest inc!ease in subsidization which merits serious 
consideration. 
This study has revealed very little definite quantitative informa~ 
tion. An important point which it does bring out, however, is that 
assessment valuations can diverge substantially from assessment criteria, 
and different classes of property can be valued on different bases. If' 
a federal program of in lieu payments could ultimately stimulate interest 
in determining the appropriateness of all assessed valuatio~g; this 
might reasonably contribute to the public welfare in many cities through-
out the country. 
